Renewed Violence in Nagorno-Karabakh: An Endgame or More Instability to Come?
On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijani armed forces began large-scale shelling of targets in Nagorno-Karabakh, causing death, injury, and damage to property. The active hostilities did not come as a surprise. In preceding weeks, there were numerous reports of the build-up of Azerbaijani troops on the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh as well as with Armenia. The appearance of a new symbol on military hardware – an upside-down letter A – added to the speculations that plans were underway for a new round of attacks.
The massive bloodshed of the Second Karabakh War may have come to an end after forty-four days with the trilateral agreement brokered by Moscow and signed by the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia on the night of November 9-10, 2020. However, acts of violence against what remains of Nagorno-Karabakh patrolled by Russian peacekeepers and against Armenia proper have been a regular phenomenon ever since the spring of 2021. There is a rather lengthy Wikipedia entry laying out major and minor incursions and attacks which have cost lives and have damaged infrastructure. Other practices, such as kidnappings, cattle rustling, and the blocking of highways by Azerbaijani forces have added to tensions. The most far-reaching such incidents were the fighting on November 16, 2021 and September 12-14, 2022, both on the effectively new borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In Nagorno-Karabakh, beyond other documented violations, the ongoing partial or whole blockade remains the issue of greatest concern, to the extent that its possible consequences have been characterized as “genocidal” by the founding chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno Ocampo.
The government of Azerbaijan offers its own perspectives on the developments mentioned above. Inconsistent readings of the November 9-10, 2020 statement between Baku and Yerevan lie at the heart of the matter. In addition, selective understandings and applications of public international law by Baku exacerbate the circumstances. Finally, the role of the international community – in particular, cross-negotiations, or perhaps short-circuited negotiations, led in parallel by the Kremlin and the West – have largely proven ineffective.
naregseferian.com 