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"Armenian and Turkish Relations between 1991 and 2010: The Failure to Achieve a Breakthrough in the Aftermath of the Cold War"

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Abstract

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the relations between the Armenians and the Turks entered a new phase with the establishment of an independent Republic of Armenia. The inter-state interactions that followed took place in a context that also included regional players, the international community, as well as the organised Armenian Diaspora. This thesis argues that the difficulty to come to a lasting regional peace can be explained by (1) the relative weakness on the part of the Armenian state vis-à-vis Turkey, as well as (2) the unstable domestic political situation in Turkey in the 1990s coupled with the ineffective foreign policy of the AKP government in power in Ankara since 2002. A few schools of international relations theory are employed to assess the relationship: realism, liberalism, institutionalism, geopolitics, and constructivism. Given the differences in power and interests of the two states, the resulting asymmetrical relations are best explained using a constructivist approach, which helps shape a concluding section on the national psychology that underlies the interaction between Armenians and Turks, including narratives of identity and how they inform policy. The thesis concludes that, as a complex issue, with the involvement of the United States, the international community, and even with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict not too far removed, and also with neither the Republic of Armenia nor the Armenian Diaspora having enough clout to shift policy one way or another, Turkey remains the factor with the greatest potential to influence proceedings. It is domestic political considerations and the consequential unclear positions and self-contradictory actions on the part of Ankara that have gone the farthest to maintain the instability and anti-climaxes characteristic of the Armenia-Turkey story between 1991 and 2010. And therefore it will be changes within Turkey itself that will bear the greatest consequences for the future of Armenia-Turkey relations.

"On my honour as a student of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorised assistance on it."

Chapter I. Introduction

There can be many reasons for studying Armenian-Turkish affairs. My own are rather selfish, personal ones. Being Armenian, I not only bear a historical legacy that has directed the path that my family took and part of the way my own life turned out, but I continue to be involved in social, political, and economic circumstances that hinge to some degree or other on the way the Armenian people and state interacts with the Turkish people and state. As someone who tries to be thoughtful and intellectually-responsible, I take on the task of analysing the situation objectively, of gaining insights into why things are the way they are, and of discovering how matters can be made to change, serving the values of lasting peace and stability in the region.

It is the political that makes the most impactful marks, and it is the political realm that affords the greatest opportunities to tug the lines this way or that. And so I choose to focus on the political give-and-take that has taken place between the years 1991 and 2010. The start date is highly significant, because it was then that the Soviet Union collapsed and an independent Armenian state once again appeared on the world map. The last time that had happened was during a brief window between 1918 and 1920 when the Russian Revolution and the implosion of the short-lived Transcaucasian Federation resulted in a free Armenian Republic before the USSR moved in and shifted internal and external borders around. The Ottoman Empire at the time had meanwhile given way to a Turkish Republic, which turned out to be a highly significant Cold War player. All of that came to an end in 1991.

The 1990s and 2000s saw immense shifts in political affairs within Armenia and Turkey, as well as in international relations both between Armenia and Turkey, as well as the world order taken broadly. The more local geo-political and the wider global trends make for a fascinating context within which interactions between Yerevan and Ankara took place. In addition, the other factors that go into the story – and there are quite a few – offer their own takes on the direction in which the Armenia-Turkey story has gone. Four significant episodes are taken up in this thesis, following the policies of two Armenian presidents, and the general trends in Turkey for much of the time period under investigation. The fourth episode, and by far the one with potentially the most far-reaching consequences, reached its rather anticlimactic conclusion in 2010, making for an appropriate end-point.

And so, the story of the Armenians and Turks offers some noteworthy elements that make it worthwhile to explore in an academic setting. It is interesting as such, since it is does not easily fall into the category of simply two neighbouring or non-neighbouring states that had this dispute or that war, and then perhaps settled their conflict or perhaps not. It is two peoples, in fact, who found themselves together and who lived side-by-side, but who then underwent an immense upheaval, resulting in an abyss in relations. For the past twenty years and more now, the two peoples and countries have found themselves in the awkward position of having to accommodate each other's presence to begin with, to say nothing of their interests, while making efforts towards achieving anything from some sort of *modus vivendi* to a peace, all of which have ended up in uncertainty. The story is a complex one.

My background has driven me to think more deeply about the following questions in particular: What are the factors that inform relations between Armenians and Turks, and Armenia and Turkey? More specifically, how have Armenian-Turkish relations played out in the 1990s and 2000s? Who are the players and what kind of a say have they had on how things have gone, and which players will have more of a say on how they might go, as this story continues?

An "analytical storytelling" approach is adopted for the methodology of this thesis. This implies a historical and chronological account to be sure, but, more importantly, it offers an interpretation of the story ultimately as a narrative, with all the connotations that that word brings with it. A part of what makes the interactions between the Armenians and the Turks interesting is that it has played itself out as a narrative for a number of decades now: a clash of popular, often mediated, perceptions, as opposed to an outright conflict, whether violent or otherwise. Indeed, the 1990s and 2000s saw for the first time a shift in the story, moving on to the inter-state, diplomatic level. Analysing that shift both through the perspective of the narrative as well as how it affected the narrative itself – how the narrative itself changed, that is – offer fascinating insights into how public policy plays out at a psychological, cultural, or social level, especially given the stark dissimilarities in resources, demographics, and international reputation between the countries of Turkey and Armenia, as well as between the people in Turkey and Armenians throughout the world. The power differential and the interest differential in this story bring about an asymmetry that is worth exploring as a case of asymmetric state interactions taken more broadly.

This thesis is limited in the almost exclusive use of English-language sources. As a result, an impression is of a much more clear and pronounced involvement of the United States and the West in the proceedings, as opposed to, say, perspectives from Moscow or Tehran – at the same time consciously avoiding space for stereotypical or orientalist attitudes vis-à-vis Turkey. Yet, many relevant sources that deal with Armenia and Turkey are works in the English language in any case. This field is as of yet dealt with most prominently in American academic circles, led by Armenian-Americans for the most part. More Russian sources would be desirable, but still, Moscow's involvement in Armenia-Turkey relations has been less significant in the past twenty years as compared with Washington's. Certainly that would not have been an acceptable argument had this thesis also included more on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which forms an important part of the story, but the details of which will also be relegated to the sidelines for the sake of focus.

Further limitations are to be found in ignoring a number of episodes in the Armenia-Turkey story, some of which are mentioned in Appendix II. Likewise, parts of the story on what went on within Turkey in the run-up to and during the 1990s and 2000s are also set aside, focussing instead on aspects that had more bearing on Armenia-Turkey relations. In general, many details of events are left out in order to provide more room for analysis and interpretation. It is hoped that the sections laying out the main players in this story ("Dramatis Personæ") and exploring the narrative context ("Concluding Soliloquies") contribute most to gaining meaningful insights into Armenia-Turkey interactions of the recent past, and also into the near future.

The main body of the thesis lists four main historical episodes (Acts I and II, each with two scenes), as well as an additional significant episode taken up briefly in between (the Entr'acte). The thesis also includes a section on some assessment in light of theory, drawing on a few schools of thought of international relations. The approach has difficulty being exceedingly thorough or systematic, in part because the Armenia-Turkey case fails to fit neatly into any single international relations paradigm. That fact in itself, however, makes for an interesting discussion.

Chapter II. *Dramatis Personæ:* Who's Who and What They Do [1]

The stage is set. As with any good drama, however, the action cannot begin without first introducing the players, whether the ones at centre stage or those closer to the wings.

To begin with, we have the two states in question: the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey. The former is smaller and newer as a country, with far fewer inhabitants, far less of a resource base, without as much experience in the international arena, nor with the corresponding clout. The capital, Yerevan, grew as an important national centre only during its tenure as capital of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, from the 1920s on. It is the base today of a sovereign government of a republic that is largely led by its president, although the National Assembly (parliament) and the office of the prime minister have gained some more influence through the constitutional reforms of 2005, if not as much in terms of foreign policy. (The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia, it can be added, had a notable say in the final episode taken up in this thesis.) The authorities in Armenia have a poor reputation: they are widely perceived to be corrupt, certainly at home. Free and fair elections have been problematic since the very beginning – not an unusual phenomenon in the former communist world.

That is not the case in the Republic of Turkey, which rose from the ashes of the dying Ottoman Empire – and its nearly-dead Christian (Armenian, Greek, Syriac) population – to re-invent itself as a secular, modern, Western republic under the revolution of Mustafa Kemal, later dubbed Atatürk ("The Father of the Turks"), a charismatic, authoritarian leader who ushered in reforms of governance, of language and religion, and of social norms, before his death in 1938 led up to the establishment of a real, plural, parliamentary democracy. In truth, the highly influential military interfered with the domestic order of the country on more than occasion over the course of the twentieth century. As far as foreign policy went, however, the Western-leaning nature of Ankara's course was well-set by the Cold War, with NATO membership, among other similar manifestations. Part of the story taken up in this thesis involves the transition of Turkish politics away from Kemalism in the late

[1] This section builds on an essay I wrote for a Turkish journal: Nareg Seferian, "Genocide Politics: Players, Moves and An Endgame", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Fall 2010, accessed June 12, 2013, http://www.turkishpolicy.com/article/539/genocide-politics-players-moves-and-an-endgame/.

1990s and 2000s under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (abbreviated as "AKP" in Turkish – *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*). Dealing with the former Soviet world, and with Armenia right next door, formed part of the challenges the country faced in that period.

Turkey had, however, been dealing with Armenians beforehand. The third player on stage can be broadly identified as the organised Armenian Diaspora. Groups of Armenians outside of the traditional homeland between the Black, Caspian, and Mediterranean seas had long existed, especially given the widespread trade network of Armenians in the Middle Ages and the early modern era.[2] The Armenian Genocide, however, caused a greater number of Armenians than ever before to find themselves permanently in the Middle East, Europe, the Americas, and Australia in the decades following World War I. Centred around churches, cultural or patrotic associations, schools, and newspapers, Armenians put together communities that found themselves organised enough to take on political advocacy starting in earnest from the 1960s on, following the fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide that acted as a spur both in the Diaspora as well as in still-Soviet Armenia.

The most vociferous and best-organised grouping within the Armenian Diaspora is the collection of organisations that come under the umbrella of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, known in Armenian as *Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnagtsoutiun* or *Hay Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsoutiun* (there is a difference in pronunciation based on dialect, hence two separate transliterations into the English), often shortened to the "Tashnag" or "Dashnak" party, referred to mostly as "hard-liners" or "nationalists". This organisation started out in Tbilisi, now capital of Georgia, in the Russian Empire in the 1890s, bringing together various armed, socialist revolutionaries aiming to liberate the Armenian-populated territory of the Ottoman Empire, known in Armenian circles as "Western Armenia". It transformed itself into a political party that led the short-lived Armenian Republic of 1918 that grew out of the Russian Revolution, but could not escape Sovietisation in 1920. In the next decades, the Dashnaks pulled together a large enough base to support affiliated churches, schools, newspapers, youth organisations, sports and cultural associations, that enable it to maintain a wide network across the entire Diaspora today. It is the

[2] For an account of early modern Armenian merchants, see Sebouh Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa* (University of California Press, 2011).

leading force in advocacy efforts, whether in Washington or Brussels, or even in Buenos Aires or Canberra.

That is not to say that there are not other factions within the Diaspora. Besides smaller groupings or unaffiliated, independent organisations, there exists the wider category of the non-Dashnaks, which are often less nationalistic in their policy positions, and which found more meaning and prominence in an anti-Dashnak stance during the Cold War, when ties with Soviet Armenia largely took place through them. The Dashnak Diaspora had rejected the new authorities in Yerevan following their own loss of power. The non-Dashnaks are not as well-organised, their media outlets tend to be weaker, but they do participate in advocacy efforts, even if the end of the Cold War has caused the differentiation between the factions to lose some of its imperative. Still, the non-Dashnaks have showcased more willingness to engage in dialogue with Turkey and with Turks, for example, side-by-side with the authorities in Yerevan, as can be seen in the episodes taken up in this thesis. They are often characterised as "liberals".

In terms of Armenians, the next group that has a role to play in this story are the Armenians of Turkey today, almost exclusively relegated to Istanbul and its environs, a place that did not witness as much outright massacres during the Armenian Genocide. Most of the Armenian population there, however, consist of descendants of survivors of the deportations that, over the course of the twentieth century, moved to the big city to consolidate the Armenian population under the watchful eye of both the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople – the leftover spiritual head of the erstwhile Ottoman *millet* (officially-recognised, national-confessional minority), still charged with dealing with religious matters of the Armenian population of Turkey – as well as the Turkish state itself that controls the leadership of the Armenian Patriarchate. The haven of Istanbul lasted some decades, but discriminatory policies and particular incidents, such as disproportionate taxation during the Second World War, pogroms directed against Greeks and Armenians in 1955, and the Cyprus issue of the 1960s and 1970s, caused much emigration. Still, the Armenians continue to be a visible community in Istanbul, with churches, schools, and newspapers. Their numbers have, in fact, recently been augmented with an ironic influx of Armenians from Armenia itself, many of whom live and work in Turkey illegally. The political clout of the Armenians of Turkey is difficult to determine, but the prominence of the journalist Hrant Dink, for example, whose murder in 2007 was

followed by massive street rallies, leaves little doubt that the community remains in the spotlight, especially given the domestic policies vis-à-vis minorities that the AKP has taken on since coming to power in the early 2000s. One may also include in this group Turks or individuals of other ethnic backgrounds in Turkey (most notably Kurds), as well as prominent Turks outside of Turkey, who consistently provide support to Armenians, especially to the Armenians of Turkey, in the field of human rights, often through academia or civil society activism, within the wider context of the increasing democratisation of Turkey.

Yet another Armenian consideration on stage is the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, known in Armenian as "Artsakh". The collapse of the USSR saw a few armed conflicts and territorial disputes arise between the peoples who had proclaimed their heartfelt *druzhba* ("friendship") for so long. A major clash involved the Armenian-populated autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh in Soviet Azerbaijan, an enclave having discontiguous borders with Armenia, though right next to it. That administrative unit was separated from the Karabakh plains while keeping it within Soviet Azerbaijan as the Union was being organised in the 1920s. While efforts were made to re-draw the map inside the Soviet Union over the course of the twentieth century, it was only with *glasnost* and *perestroika* in the 1980s that a peaceful movement initiated by Armenians gave rise to ethnic clashes and, finally, a full-scale armed conflict, which has subsided since a cease-fire in 1994. The dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh is a crucial aspect of this story, if formally a separate issue. The negotiations for its resolution are ongoing, mediated under the auspices of the OSCE by Russia, the United States, and France.[3]

Those negotiations are held between the high-level officials (more often than not the foreign ministers, and often the presidents) of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the next major player in this story – and a sovereign state. The Azerbaijani people are ethnic kin with Turks, using a similar language and invoking a common, Turkic heritage, even with some differences, such as a nominal Shiite predominance, as opposed to the Sunnism of Turkey. More importantly, Baku and Ankara have enjoyed excellent relations ever since Azerbaijan's independence, a relationship that has only strengthened as the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian get exploited more and more,

[3] For full accounts of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, see Thomas de Waal, *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* (New York, London: New York University Press, 2003) and Tatul Hakobyan, *Karabakh Diary, Green and Black: Neither War nor Peace* (Yerevan, 2010).

reaching Western markets through Georgian and Turkish territory. Azerbaijan's position is rather blunt: relations with Armenia cannot come at any cost to Azerbaijan, and any attempt at reaching out to Armenia is perceived as already coming at a cost to Azerbaijan. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an essential, existential issue for Baku.

Remaining within the neighbourhood, there lie two other important players, namely Russia and Iran. However, in terms of influencing ties between Armenia and Turkey *per se*, those two states have had a less-than-immediate role in the 1990s and 2000s. Not to diminish their prominence, but, in fairness, the 1990s were highly unstable times for Russia itself, whose influence on the world stage had greatly fallen as the Cold War drew to a close. Moscow remains undoubtedly a key player when it comes to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, but it has not, at least publicly, affected the Yerevan-Ankara connection to any significant degree. Iran, for its part, has also been on a rocky road in general in the region and beyond, although its relations with Armenia have been cordial since the beginning. The presence of a significant and old Armenian community in Iran serves to maintain the warm ties between Tehran and Yerevan. The country has showcased participation in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, certainly, as Tehran has had wary eyes on Baku for a long time, ethno-national concerns relating to Azerbaijanis in Iran serving as a primary motivational force. But Iran's stake in the Armenia-Turkey story is not a big one.

A very big, if geographically distant, player in this story is unsurprisingly the United States. In keeping with its prominent role in the world as such, and also bearing in mind the inroads that America made and continues to make towards the former Soviet Union, interactions with Armenia have been high on the agenda ever since 1991. The presence of an organised Armenian Diaspora community in the country – one filled with both the Dashnak and non-Dashnak factions represented as formal advocacy organisations in Washington, DC – only adds to the imperative, to say nothing of consequences arising from the profound diplomatic, economic, and military ties between Turkey and the United States, as well as the millions spent by Ankara in lobbying on Capitol Hill. The United States is also a co-mediator in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The other co-mediator, alongside Russia, is France. It would be more useful in laying out this thesis to take on "Europe" as an outside influence, by which one may mean the European Union, or European bodies such as the European Commission, or even the Council of Europe (strictly a third cousin of the European family, it is true,

but with meaningful consequences, such as at the European Court of Human Rights). Europe has meant a great deal for Turkish foreign policy, especially in the 1990s and 2000s. It, too, had a part to play in Armenia-Turkey relations, as shown in this thesis. One can also take the liberty of expanding this category to "Europe and Other", to include other international organisations, the OSCE for one, which has served as a forum more for Armenia-Azerbaijan interactions, but also for Armenia and Turkey to air their grievances. BSEC – the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation – can also feature as a multi-lateral organisation offering opportunities for diplomacy. As for the United Nations, it has had a minor role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but nothing consequential when it comes to relations between Armenia and Turkey.

Finally, one may also take into account, for the sake of thoroughness, that there exist in particular in North America and in Europe, but also elsewhere, communities of Turks and Azerbaijanis that have been established since the end of the Second World War and the Cold War. Though they do not conform as strictly to the level of organisation of the Armenian Diaspora – and, indeed, they do not yet maintain a diaspora tradition in the same, classical sense, as do the Armenians, Jews, and Greeks, for example – they at the same time are reaching levels of organisation in Washington, Brussels, and many other capitals to challenge Armenian advocacy efforts. It is highly essential to note, however, the key difference between the organised Armenian Diaspora and the as-yet-*émigré* communities of Turks and Azerbaijanis, namely, that, for the most part, the Turks and Azerbaijanis follow the lines and often act at the very behest of Ankara and Baku, whereas the organised Armenian Diaspora existed before the sovereign Republic of Armenia appeared and very often takes on its own policy positions and actions without co-ordinating with Yerevan in the least. The Dashnak faction in particular acts independently. All in all, though, the role of Turkish or Azerbaijani communities in directly affecting Armenia-Turkey relations has been negligible.

For the sake of some more comprehensiveness, mention must also be made of Georgia as a state, and how its relations with its neighbours and its conflicts can affect the regional dynamic. Moreover, the role played by Israel on the one hand in the region, specifically in its relations with Turkey and Iran, and the Jewish-American lobby on the other hand, can also be shown to have an affect on Armenia-Turkey relations, such as in supporting or thwarting Armenian advocacy efforts in Washington. Finally, the Kurdish issue has the potential of strongly influencing the

next steps in the Armenia-Turkey story; even today, their participation in reforms involving minorities and Armenians within Turkey is not insignificant, and the goings-on tomorrow involving Kurds in eastern Turkey, in northern Iraq, and in Syria could have much wider repurcusions. However, given space considerations and the specific time focus on the 1990s and 2000s, these additional factors will not be considered in this thesis.

Chapter III. *Act I, Scene I:* Enter Armenia.
Fits and starts under Levon Ter-Petrosyan[4]

The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics took the world quite by surprise. No-one was expecting the largest country in the world, one with such a strict, authoritarian regime, to find its frontiers falling, transforming the borders of Eastern Europe, with further consequences on parts of the world not directly adjacent to the now-corroded Iron Curtain. The old order went out relatively quickly.

The change left an immense mark on the South (formerly Trans-) Caucasus. Not only did the early 1990s see the establishment of the republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, but they also witnessed three territorial conflicts in the region, the most consequential for Armenia-Turkey relations being the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Whereas Yerevan was not formally, immediately involved with the dispute that escalated into a war – that is to say, Armenians of Soviet Azerbaijan and Soviet Armenia were a main force in the struggle, as opposed to official policymakers leading a government, at least at first – Armenia did, of course, end up participating, and had to live with the aftermath of redirected resources, limitations caused by blockades, and navigating the diplomatic channels that grew murkier and choppier in the unstable atmosphere of the New World Order.

In terms of domestic politics, Armenia's rocky road to freedom included a transition to a market economy and a democratic republic led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, an academic.

> "Soon after independence … it became apparent that domestic systemic deficiencies would not permit the immediate introduction of political and economic policies predicated on principles of democratization and liberalization. The obsolete institutions, bureaucratic customs, and the political culture as developed under the Communist Party hindered the transition from the centrally planned system to a more decentralized, democratic polity. Moreover, the absence of the interrepublic industrial networks as developed during the Soviet era posed a serious challenge to the emerging Armenian economy. The republic hardly possessed the infrastructure necessary for independent economic development and long-term financial stability. The deplorable conditions inherited from the Soviet

[4] Chapters III and IV of this thesis rely on Tatul Hakobyan, *Armenians and Turks: From War to Cold War and to Diplomacy* (Yerevan, 2013) – a comprehensive study of relations between the two peoples and countries since the Armenian Genocide. As the book was going to press at the time of writing, exact page numbers were unavailable; chapter numbers have been cited instead.

> regime in the aftermath of the earthquake in 1988 and the military conflict in Karabagh further exacerbated the situation. President Levon Ter Petrosyan sought to enlist the support of the diasporan communities to ameliorate the conditions, but widespread corruption, poverty, unemployment, and irreconcilable disagreements on foreign policy (e.g., Karabagh) undermined the legitimacy of the government and led to his resignation in 1998."[5]

Foreign policy during Ter-Petrosyan's time in power – even before he was formally inaugurated as the first president, and later re-elected under fraudulent and discouraging circumstances – offered the opportunity to get the ball rolling in establishing and maintaining ties in the name of a sovereign Armenia, something that had last been possible only with the brief window of the Armenian Republic of 1918-1920. As in that era, the most sensitive relationship to be developed was, naturally, with Turkey. Ter-Petrosyan's party, the Armenian National Movement (ANM), had somewhat contradictory policy positions in that regard.

> "On the one hand, the ANM's ideologists found it important to establish friendly relations with Turkey while, on the other hand, they included points in the programme of the movement that obviously made the Turks nervous and made the vision to establish relations nearly impossible. Thus, the movement's programme wanted 'to reach the recognition by the UN of the 1915 Armenian Genocide and the international recognition of the historical and legal right of the Armenian nation towards territories seized from Armenia,' as well as struggle for the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR 'to acknowledge the articles concerning Armenia [namely, the border between what would be the USSR and Turkey] in the March 16, 1921, Russian-Turkish treaty, as illegal'."[6]

At the same time, Ter-Petrosyan and his team exhorted the public against subscribing to the notion of "permanent friends" (taken to mean Russia, portrayed as a long-time ally and protector of the Armenian people) and "permanent enemies" (meaning, of course, Turkey). More specifically, they argued against including a clause on the genocide in what was to be Armenia's declaration on independence. Ultimately, that clause went through, acting as the first formal bone of contention with Ankara.[7]

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[5] Simon Payaslian, *The History of Armenia: From the Origins to the Present* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 199-200.
[6] Tatul Hakobyan, *Armenians and Turks: From War to Cold War and to Diplomacy* (Yerevan, 2013), Chapter 16.
[7] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 16.

The "permanent enemies" positions had long been taken and continues to be a mainstay for the Dashnak camp of the Armenian Diaspora. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsoutiun re-entered the Armenian political scene as a party upon the country's independence – as it turned out, much to Ter-Petrosyan's chagrin. Although the president had made efforts to include Diasporans in his immediate circle and cabinet, the gap in perceptions and expectations was wide in terms of policy, and especially when it came to foreign affairs.

> "The Dashnaktsutiun underscored the close relationship between Turkish recognition of the genocide and the territorial issues of the Armenian lands under Turkish control and Nakhijevan [an exclave between Armenia and Iran] under Azerbaijani control, on one hand, and the conflict in Karabagh, on the other. In contrast, Ter Petrosyan and the Armenian National Movement insisted on the physical security of Armenia as their immediate objective; concerns regarding the sovereignty of Karabagh were secondary. In an interview, Ter Petrosyan stated … 'There will always be a mutual lack of understanding and trust … so long as the Diaspora leadership does not come to terms with the reality that policy is determined here, on this land.'"[8]

Certainly the most telling incident that showcased the mismatched perceptions was the resignation in late 1992, after less than a year in office, of the first foreign minister, an American-born Armenian who was raised in the Dashnak Diaspora (although he did not represent the party as a politician or minister), following a fiery speech in Istanbul that opposed the policies that Ter-Petrosyan was pursuing.[9] Later, at the end of 1994, citing allegations of criminal activity, terrorism, and intrigue, Ter-Petrosyan banned the Dashnaks as a political party in Armenia, an act that was met with great hostility in much of the organised Diaspora, to add to the indignation caused by the reaching out that Yerevan had meanwhile been making to Ankara.

The Turkish ambassador in Moscow had had occasions to visit still-Soviet Armenia in the preceding years, and had already laid down two major issues of concern for Ankara: relinquishing the cause of gaining recognition of the Armenian Genocide and accepting the borders in place between the two countries as they were.[10] Not much later, one more contention was added to the list, namely, resolving the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in a manner favourable for Azerbaijan. These three

[8] Payaslian, *op. cit.*, 203-204.
[9] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 17.
[10] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 16.

points are often referred to in Armenian circles as the preconditions put forth by Turkey for establishing relations with Armenia.

Turkey was not opposed to the recognition of the Republic of Armenia as such, however, and, indeed, it was one of the very first countries to do so. That act did not deter what remained a troublesome official relationship from the very start. The earliest formal ties between Turkey and Armenia involved humanitarian shipments to help alleviate the dire conditions brought on by the war, the economic transition, and the aftermath of a devastating December, 1988 earthquake in the north of Armenia. A railway link existed between the two countries at the time, and although the land border was open in order to be used for special purposes – delegations and emergency supplies of grain, but no ordinary travellers or goods – tensions led to the unilateral closure of the border by Turkey in April, 1993, following Armenian advances in Nagorno-Karabakh.[11] The air border was also affected, with Turkish airspace closed to flights to and from Armenia for two years, being re-opened only following pressure from the United States in 1995.[12]

In terms of the international community, although Armenia, along with the other former Soviet republics, did not face much difficulty in joining the United Nations, the participation of Armenia in two other bodies came under Turkish influence. The Conference (later Organisation) for Security and Co-operation in Europe – the OSCE, the forum for mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – saw the threat of a veto by Turkey in admitting Armenia to its ranks, unless the first two preconditions mentioned above were met. The stand-off was resolved at the end of January, 1992, again, only through American mediation.[13]

Literally days later, however, the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) was founded in Istanbul, among the membership of which was Armenia, upon the initiative of Turkey itself. Of course, BSEC does not have the clout of the OSCE, but it does provide the unique opportunity for Armenia to maintain a formal, inter-governmental representation in Istanbul, which was opened ten years later. Neither country has meanwhile opened a bilateral embassy or a consulate on the other's territory, or even an interests section. Turkey's role in establishing and leading BSEC is just one indicator of how one-sided Armenian-

[11] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 17.
[12] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 19.
[13] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 17.

Turkish relations can be, given the power and interest differentials of the two states: it is worth more for Armenia to have even a secondary representation in Istanbul – at Turkey's pleasure, no less – than for any formal mission to be sent from Ankara to Yerevan.

The most serious manifestation, however, of less-than-cordial relations between Armenia and Turkey arose from the war over Nagorno-Karabakh, which continues to cast a very wide and long shadow. Turkish volunteers had found their way to Azerbaijan during the course of the war, alongside official Turkish military advisors in Baku. In addition, direct military intervention in Armenia was called for by some political forces in Ankara. September, 1993, saw a build-up of troops along the Turkish-Armenian frontier, including provocative surveillance flights, and firing in Armenia's direction on three occasions. The Kurdish issue was used as a pretext, and instability in Russia – at the time in the midst of a violent domestic political crisis – was encouraging for Ankara, although a Russian military official warned that a Turkish invasion in Armenia might spark a more general war, a statement that probably had the greatest affect in deterring Turkey.[14]

Over the course of Ter-Petrosyan's presidency, there were a number of occasions that Armenian and Turkish delegations crossed paths in Turkey, in Armenia, and elsewhere. More often than not, issues were discussed, but very few concrete steps were taken. Nothing lasting came of most of the meetings. An interesting episode early on involved the possibility of using a Turkish port on the Black Sea as an outlet for Armenia, spearheaded by a rich Turkish entrepreneur of Jewish background and a wealthy Armenian-American businessman – not from the Dashnak faction, but in fact a leader of the non-Dashnak advocacy group in Washington and a supporter of Ter-Petrosyan. According to the plan, a dock at Trabzon was to be allocated to the new republic. As with the other fits and starts of Armenia-Turkish relations in this period, the project never got off the ground, much less set sail.[15]

On the other hand, a not insignificant initiative was made in 1997 and continues to function, albeit with inconsistent spates of activity. The Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC),

[14] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 18.
[15] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 16.

> "created the first and only official link between the public and private sectors in each of the two countries' communities.
> …
> [Its] aim is not only to establish direct trade and business links in various sectors … but also to support the border opening and the establishment of interstate relations between Armenia and Turkey by maintaining close ties between both governments. These close ties will help both countries forge strong global economic policies."[16]

Armenia and Turkey do carry on trade with each other, either through individuals or small businesses taking advantage of the regular charter flights set up between Yerevan and Istanbul, or through transporting goods via Georgia. A number of Armenian holidaymakers also prefer to spend time at seaside resorts on the Turkish Mediterranean coast, a phenomenon that faces criticism, especially from Dashnak circles both within Armenia and certainly in the Diaspora. The existence of the TABDC is a testament to the often paradoxical and ironic relationship in which Armenia and Turkey find themselves. It also brings to light how economic interests can drive the relationship between the two countries in a certain direction, even with political and social circumstances being less than flexible.

[16] Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council, "Activity Report 1997-Present", August 11, 2008, accessed April 13, 2013, http://www.tabdc.org/index.php?Sid=9.

Chapter IV. *Act I, Scene II:* Armenia Somewhat Re-cast. Policy under Robert Kocharyan

Facing domestic pressure, Ter-Petrosyan resigned in 1998, paving the way for his hand-picked prime minister Robert Kocharyan, who was earlier president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, to be president following extraordinary elections. The foreign policy pursued by Kocharyan over the next ten years – as he, too, was re-elected under allegations of vote-rigging in 2003 – differed from Ter-Petrosyan's line markedly when it came to relations with Turkey, informing at the same time the Armenia-Diaspora dynamic.

The ban on the Dashnak party was lifted, for one thing; the party even joined in as a coalition government partner. The Republic of Armenia also held three Armenia-Diaspora conferences between 1999 and 2006. Most significantly and most publicly, Yerevan adopted as part of its formal foreign policy agenda the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. At the same time, the government was mindful of the sensitivities around resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the potential for relations with Turkey, at least on the economic front.

> "… [Armenian Genocide recognition] declarations were meant for diasporan consumption rather than guiding policy. The Kocharyan government appeared to follow a two-pronged approach to this issue. Its public announcements at times supported and at times refuted the claim that Erevan would insist on Turkish recognition as a precondition for normalization of relations. The Kocharyan government, however, could not control lobbying efforts and political campaigns in diasporan communities. Lobbying host governments for the recognition of the genocide had gained backing from all Armenian communities during the Cold War, when Moscow determined Armenia's foreign policy and shielded the republic from the pressures of the international political economy and geopolitical competitions. In the 1990s, however, Armenia, now a sovereign state, had to assume direct responsibility for its own domestic and foreign policies. The continued practice of lobbying in diasporan communities for genocide recognition placed enormous pressure on the government in Erevan, and the Kocharyan government appeared to adopt a balanced approach to domestic economic priorities and demands to place the recognition of the genocide on the nation's foreign policy agenda."[17]

Confidence in the Armenian government in general was shattered, however, following an armed attack on the country's parliament on the 27th of October, 1999,

[17] Payaslian, *op. cit.*, 226. "Erevan" is another transliteration into English of Armenia's capital.

as a result of which two senior politicians – the prime minister and the speaker – were killed, alongside other parliamentarians. The event remains mired in controversy and conspiracy. It might have affected the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, as some allege, but it does not seem to have had as direct implications for Armenia-Turkey relations.[18]

Contacts between Turkish and Armenian officials continued in the late 1990s and into the early 2000s, more often than not on the sidelines of summits or other international conferences. What remained a thorn in the side for Armenia was the linkage with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue that Ankara did not cease to maintain in discussing the establishment of diplomatic relations with Yerevan. An important turn of events for Nagorno-Karabakh were talks between the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents under direct US auspices, in Key West, Florida, in 2001. Whereas they did not yield any results, they were nevertheless valuable internationally for the significance Washington gave to hosting them.

A notable incident in the Armenia-Turkey story came in the run-up to the eightieth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and Armenian President Kocharyan exchanged letters in 2005. A proposal from Ankara envisaged the creation of an inter-governmental commission, meant to study the genocide issue. The Armenian response was, and continues to be, willingness to discuss bilateral matters, but never the fact of the genocide itself. Such moves are perceived by both Yerevan and the Diaspora as creating illusions of co-operation and dialogue in order to dissuade foreign bodies from, for example, passing resolutions on the Armenian Genocide.[19] Similar calls and responses accompanied the Armenia-Turkey Protocols a few years later, with similar, inconclusive results.

On the other hand, Robert Kocharyan did explicitly state in an interview with a prominent Turkish journalist some years earlier, in 1999, that, "Genocide recognition by Turkey will not lead to legal consequences for territorial claims".[20] Still, Armenia did not back down on bringing up the Armenian Genocide at available opportunities, much less on somehow influencing Diaspora organisations to reduce their long-time advocacy efforts. The Dashnak faction especially had been acting independently of Yerevan in any case.

[18] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 20.
[19] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 22.
[20] David L. Phillips, *Diplomatic History: The Turkey-Armenia Protocols* (2012), accessed May 4, 2013, http://hrcolumbia.org/peacebuilding/diplomatic_history.pdf, quoted at 16.

One must note, however, that Kocharyan's time in power also saw the rise and fall of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC). Although that project was formally independent of the Armenian and Turkish governments, they were both very much abreast of the proceedings and it was well within their power to influence it one way or another.

Chapter V. *Entr'acte:* The Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission[21]

If the first stage of a new era of relations between Armenia and Turkey consisted of punctured attempts at formal diplomacy, a faltering next step took place in the context of what was then still a relatively novel concept: Track II diplomacy.

> "The brainchild of a handful of academics, free-thinking State Department bureaucrats, and public intellectuals in the 1970s, 'Track II' diplomacy grew out of the observation that private individuals, meeting unofficially, can find their way to common ground that official negotiators can't. … Governments once viewed Track II as a kind of feel-good exercise at best, and at worst as a genuine threat – freelance diplomacy, after all, can damage the real kind. But three decades later, most of them have come to understand that an era of unconventional conflicts requires unconventional solutions."[22]

A proponent and practitioner of Track II diplomacy by his own account, David L. Phillips was involved with American efforts in getting Turks and Kurds and Turks and Greeks on both the mainland and on Cyprus around the same table. Why not try bringing together Turks and Armenians as well? This would work, according to Phillips, as,

> "Track Two activities create a context for civil society to develop mutual understanding with the goal of transferring their insights into decision-makers and shaping public opinion.
> …
> Track Two is an unofficial exercise in problem solving. It engages private citizens in exploring the conditions that give rise to conflict and developing joint strategies for addressing shared problems. The goal is to foster collaboration so that conflict comes to be seen as a shared problem requiring the cooperation of both sides. Though the virtue of Track Two lies in its independence from official positions, Track Two can enhance diplomacy when developed in close coordination with diplomatic efforts."[23]

The Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission, or TARC, as it came to be known, was established in 2001 as part of a US government initiative known as "the

[21] This section relies on David L. Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation* (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005). Phillips was the principle architect of the TARC project. His memoir is an interesting first-hand account of its proceedings.
[22] Charles Homans, "Track II Diplomacy: A Short History", *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2011, accessed April 9, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/20/track_ii_diplomacy.
[23] David L. Phillips. *Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation*, (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005), 1-2.

Track Two Program on Turkey and the Caucasus". The experiment was led by Phillips, with State Department support. Phillips held initial meetings with prominent Armenians and Turks, including at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna in June, 2000. Progress was delayed by a proposed resolution in the US Congress on recognition and condemnation of the Armenian Genocide. After President Clinton asked House Speaker Hastert to pull the resolution, citing national security concerns, Phillips accelerated his efforts, managing to collect ten former bureaucrats from Armenia and Turkey by July, 2001.

The idea was to involve individuals who were not formally connected with governments at the time, but who had strong enough connections with the respective administrations to both sound out and to influence policy. The group could not include extremists or nationalists, but it also had to be realistic in taking into account wider political positions of the participants. The genocide issue was, of course, the thorniest. Unsurprisingly, emotions ran dangerously high on more than one occasion, and TARC saw the verge of its own collapse on more than one occasion as well, before it finally dissolved itself in April, 2004. The membership of the group underwent some changes during those nearly three years of functioning.

It was a highly sensitive and in fact problematic project from the very beginning. Confidence was one issue, confidentiality was another. The existence of the group could not be secret, but the exact details of its work was sometimes available, sometimes not, sometimes contradictory. Phillips mentions the handling of the media as requiring particular adroitness. More than that, however, it was the inability of the participants to see eye-to-eye on why they were even in the same room.

> "Despite their agreement to go forward, it was apparent that the Turks and Armenians had fundamentally different expectations of TARC. The Armenians saw TARC as a vehicle for approaching Turkish elites and initiating a dialogue about the genocide. Even if Turks are sympathetic to the suffering of Armenians, they were not prepared to have TARC acknowledge the genocide.
>
> …
>
> The goal of fostering human relations and building mutual understanding might have been more realizable with different participants. By including individuals closely linked to the establishment in their countries, TARC traded

> amity for the hope of substantive progress. The trade-off might have been worth it had TARC, in fact, achieved a major policy breakthrough."[24]

Phillips is candid in acknowledging the limitations the initiative faced. Besides hindrances from within the group, TARC had to weather an immense storm of criticism, expectedly, from all sides. As far as Armenians were concerned, the question of the Armenian Genocide remained non-negotiable. The existence of TARC was easily taken to be a sell-out, and even manipulation by the US State Department. What is more, according to one Armenian-American quoting an Azerbaijani source, a Turkish member of TARC explicitly admitted:

> "The main goal of our commission is to impede Armenian Genocide recognition initiatives put forth every year in the U.S. Congress and parliaments of Western countries for the 'genocide issue' and aimed at weakening Turkey… The significant matter for us is that the 'genocide issue' is not discussed by the American Congress any more. Because, as long as we continue the dialogue, the issue will not be brought to the Congress agenda. If it is not discussed in the Congress, we, being Turkey, will gain from that. The U.S. Congress will see that there is a channel of dialogue between Turks and Armenians and decide that 'there is no necessity for the Congress to take such [a] decision while such a channel exists.'"[25]

The quotation is from mid-to-late 2001, which seems too early to draw any such conclusion. However, the fact is that this perception was current then and remains prevalent among many in Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora, in particular in the Dashnak camp. Over a hundred European-Armenian organisations, for example, signed a declaration opposing the re-emergence of the initiative after a falling-out caused TARC to temporarily suspend its activities.[26] The reaction out of Azerbaijan was also not enthusiastic in the least. Any move by Ankara towards Yerevan is perceived as a betrayal in Baku, a scenario that would play out much more clearly with the Armenia-Turkey Protocols less than a decade later, but which was also not without consequence when it came to TARC either.

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[24] Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, 53-54.

[25] K. M. Greg Sarkissian, "Sarkissian: The Pitfalls of a Historical Commission", *Armenian Weekly*, November 20, 2009, footnote 5, citing *California Courier Online*, November 15, 2001, referencing in turn the Azerbaijani periodical *525-Gazet*, July 19, 2001, accessed April 9, 2013, http://www.armenianweekly.com/2009/11/20/sarkissian-the-pitfalls-of-a-historical-commission/.

[26] "TARC Opposition Increases With 13 New Signatories", *Asbarez*, September 11, 2002, accessed April 9, 2013, http://asbarez.com/47802/tarc-opposition-increases-with-13-new-signatories/.

However, Phillips notes that TARC did manage at the same time to pin at least two feathers onto its cap. For one thing, a number of civil society projects came about as a result of direct and indirect contacts and auxiliary initiatives. Though formal diplomatic channels remained clogged, bringing Track II to the table allowed for cultural exchanges, academic and scholarly events, and ties in the field of sports, for example. At the very least, TARC created the atmosphere for such connections to be made, building on the example of the TABDC earlier that aims to develop economic ties between the two countries. More consequentially, financing was made available through the State Department to implement various Track II projects.

The more substantive and controversial outcome of TARC's activities, however, was a report it commissioned from the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), an NGO based in New York, "work[ing] to help societies in transition address legacies of massive human rights violations and build civic trust in state institutions as protectors of human rights … by providing technical expertise and knowledge of relevant comparative experiences in transitional justice from across the globe".[27]

Tellingly, that report was almost done away with even before research on it began. Although the wording was finally agreed upon by both the Armenian and Turkish members of the group –

> "TARC requests that ICTJ facilitate the provision of an independent third party analysis of the applicability of the 1948 Genocide Convention to events at the beginning of the twentieth century [and that] this analysis … be made available to TARC on a confidential basis."[28]

– the organisation itself refused to go on until the objections raised by a Turkish member on the interpretation of the question were allayed. In addition, an Armenian member of the group revealed the fact of the commission of the study to the media, which added to tensions. TARC almost died as a result, but it was re-constituted soon afterwards. The analysis was given the go-ahead following presentations by each side to the ICTJ. So sensitive was the issue that, in the end, the ICTJ declared itself to be a mere facilitator for the study, not involving its own experts or staff in carrying it out.

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[27] International Center for Transitional Justice, "About Us", accessed April 9, 2013, http://ictj.org/about.
[28] Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, 99.

Finally, in early 2003, the analysis concluded – in strictly legal terms – that "the Events" did, in fact, constitute genocide, although the Genocide Convention of 1948 could not be applied retroactively as per international law.[29] The news came as vindication for Armenians, while also providing some satisfaction to the Turkish side. The study itself was more widely discussed in the Armenian media than in the Turkish one, but has remained relatively obscure ever since. The fact that it is an independent study facilitated by an NGO acting as a third party to a Track II initiative, it can be argued, takes away from any real political or diplomatic gravitas.

Having the ICTJ independently affirm the veracity of the Armenian Genocide – or, rather, the accuracy of the applicability of the term – while simultaneously granting assurances of no legal consequences for Turkey was perceived by the Dashnak Diaspora as a gesture without integrity. The line of the Dashnak camp has been and continues to be that the sincerity of any discussion surrounding the facts of the Armenian Genocide is questionable. All of the Armenian participants of TARC were, after all, pointedly non-Dashnak, quite by design.

[29] Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, 112-113. See Appendix III for the executive summary of the analysis.

Chapter VI. *Act II, Scene I:* Meanwhile, in Turkey…

The transformation of what remained of the Ottoman Empire into the Republic of Turkey is one of the most remarkable political and social feats of the twentieth century. In the face of extreme Great Powers pressure, Mustafa Kemal managed to salvage vast Anatolian territory to establish a new regime, based in Ankara, that finally met with international recognition codified by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. What followed was decades of authoritarian social engineering in the creation and development of a new, Westward-looking, secular, and modern society – but a Turkish nation-state all the same.[30]

What also followed was political and economic instability brought on in part by Cold War politics, but also domestic issues such as dealing with minorities, especially non-Turks, such as the Kurds, but also non-Muslims, such as problems with Greeks over Cyprus. A factor that is increasingly being referred to as "the deep state" was also a prominent, if clandestine, feature of Turkish political life after the death of Kemal in 1938: the military directly stepped in to assure the secular order in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Power was restored to civilian authorities each time, but under different conditions, and with the military still maintaining a strong say in deciding the direction of the country. The 1980 intervention was especially consequential, as its effects extended well into the 1990s, with some issues arising from it being addressed only today.

> "The roots of Turkey's political malaise [of the late 1990s], and its failure to resolve many related problems, are to be found in the political regime created after the coup d'état of 12 September 1980. By disqualifying former politicians and creating new institutions, the generals succeeded in de-politicizing the entire system. By the time the political rights of former politicians … were restored with the 1987 referendum, the entire political architecture of the country had been altered. The centre-left and centre-right had been fractured and non-systemic parties like the Islamists and the neo-fascists were able to play a critical role."[31]

The decade-long leadership of Turgut Özal – first as prime minister, then as the country's first civilian president – ended with his unexpected death in 1993, but

[30] For an account of the nation-building plan of early republican Turkey, see Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
[31] Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford: Oneworld, UK, 2003), 167-168.

sweeping economic reforms were implemented in that time, complemented by the fall of the Berlin Wall and all that that event entailed for Turkey and its neighbours to the east. Turkey reached out to the former Soviet world, in particular emphasising ties with the Turkic republics, that is, with those new states with cultures that drew from the Turkic heritage (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and also regions of Russia such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, among other areas where Turkic cultures are prevalent). Relations with Baku were and continue to be given great priority in Ankara, in part due to geographic proximity, and in part due to the cultural heritage in terms of language especially; the language of Azerbaijan is very similar to that of Turkey, more so than in the case of other Turkic-speaking places. Most importantly, of course, and as already mentioned, the oil and gas resources that have steadily been exploited off the Caspian basin have found their way to Western markets via Georgia and Turkey, further strengthening ties.

In terms of relations with the United States, the events of September 11 put more focus on Turkey as a more or less successful Muslim-majority democracy, although such sentiments were followed by a clash with Washington over the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the Gaza flotilla incident in 2010 expressed a strong shift in the regional dynamic vis-à-vis Israel as well. "Who lost Turkey?" was a question being raised in the corridors of power in DC, somewhat rhetorically, but also not inconsequentially in terms of policy.[32]

It is the domestic political scene in Turkey, however, that triggered the greater activity out of Ankara on the world stage in the 2000s. This was preceded by a period of instability following Özal's death.

> "The years from the election defeat of Özal's 'Motherland' Party in November 1991 to the election victory of the Justice and Development Party in November 2002 were mostly desparate. The liberalization of Turkey's economy and the cautious opening of the political space, Özal's proactive engagement with the post-communist world emerging after 1989, the retreat of the military and the guardian state: all these processes of modest normalization were interrupted. Instead, weak coalition governments chose to collude with the military, the mafia and hundreds of contract killers, ostensibly to fight the Kurdistan Workers' Party [otherwise known as the PKK, the main Kurdish rebel group in the country's south-east], yet effectively unleashing war and terror on their citizens.

[32] James Kitfield, "Who Lost Turkey?", *National Journal*, June 21, 2010, accessed April 16, 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/ns_20100621_3616.php.

…
The 'lost decade' would see eight coalition governments and two five-month stretches of single-party rule. All parties would eventually share power with another partner, no matter how contradictory their political persuasion."[33]

The political persuasion that was most up-and-coming was Islamism, an ideology that flew in the face of the very essence of the Kemalist republic. Secularism in Turkey follows a stricter model than that of France, that is, religion is regulated by the state. Muslim clergy are, in fact rather ironically, employees of the state, but that only provides for greater control from the centre. The early years of the republic even saw the Muslim call to prayer translated into Turkish. For eighteen years, the cry of *Allahu-akbar* was rendered *Tanrı uludur*, only to be restored with the advent of multi-partyism in 1950.[34]

Religious parties have come and gone in the country, with two of them falling victims to the coups of 1971 and 1980, and two of them being banned by Turkey's highest court in 1998 and 2001. The so-called "post-modern coup" of 1997 was also a manifestation of this phenomenon in Turkish political life. Instead of an outright ousting of civilian authority, the military command intervened by pressuring the prime minister to crack down on religious institutions. Educational institutions were particularly targetted, as were media outlets that leaned towards religion. A "big brother"-style system of surveillance was set in to curtail any possibility of expression of political Islam. Even non-religious journalists or other public figures who spoke out against the military intervention were likewise targetted.[35]

It was following this atmosphere that there was yet another reform among political Islamists in Turkey, this time bringing forth the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, which has proved to be the most successful and stable political force in Ankara probably since the days of Kemal himself. Although the process is ongoing, it appears rather that "the deep state" and the influence of the military have been quashed following three decisive AKP election victories in 2002, 2007, and 2011, alongside public revelations of manipulation and conspiracy by members of the armed forces, and trials of high-ranking officers.[36]

[33] Kerem Öktem, *Turkey since 1989: Angry Nation* (Zed Books, 2011), 84-85.
[34] For a comparative discussion of secularism in Turkey, see Ahmet T. Kuru and Alfred Stepan, "Laïcité as an 'Ideal Type' and a Continuum: Comparing Turkey, France, and Senegal", in *Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey* (Columbia University Press, 2012).
[35] Öktem, *op. cit.*, 106-110.
[36] Öktem, *op. cit.*, 159-164.

The rise of religion in Turkey has been accompanied by such pointed Westernisms as "Islamic Calvinism"[37] or calls for movement towards regular, politically conservative expression, much like the Christian Democrat tradition of Europe. The investments made by the "Anatolian Tigers" – small-to-medium businesses from outside Istanbul that have fuelled the spectacular economic growth in Turkey over the course of the late 1990s and 2000s – are referred to as "green capital" because of the connotations of Islam that the enterprises bring with them. The Gülen Movement is yet another aspect of this phenomenon. The teachings of the Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, who has been in self-imposed exile in the United States since 1999, and the activities of the network of businesses, schools, and media associated with him have achieved global outreach, with significant influence on domestic policy, as well as Turkish soft power abroad.[38] Conspiracy theories about it abound. One may note, however, that Gülen-affiliated organisations do not exist in Armenia.

At the same time, the question of minorities – and Kurds and Armenians in particular – began to be a much hotter topic within Turkey itself. The aftermath of the assassination of Istanbul-Armenian newspaper editor and activist Hrant Dink in 2007 showcased vast popular support in terms of human rights, civil rights, and calls for justice. Even the fifth anniversary of his death was marked with a huge street rally.[39] A counter-rally of sorts was held one month later, however, as anti-Armenian slogans filled a gathering in a central Istanbul square to mark the twentieth anniversary of an event that occurred in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, namely a massacre of Azerbaijanis. Many within Turkey itself reacted negatively to the expressions of racism and the participation of a government official and other AKP figures in the gathering.[40]

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[37] Aasiya Lodhi, "Turkish toil brings new form of faith", *BBC News*, March 13, 2006, accessed April 16, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4788712.stm.

[38] For a discussion on Fethullah Gülen and his movement, see Bill Park, *Modern Turkey: People, state and foreign policy in a globalized world* (New York, London: Routledge, 2012), 185-203.

[39] Emil Sanamyan, "Many thousands rally in Istanbul to remember Hrant Dink", *The Armenian Reporter*, January 19, 2012, accessed April 20, 2013, http://www.reporter.am/go/article/2012-01-19-many-thousands-rally-in-istanbul-to-remember-hrant-dink.

[40] "Among the speakers at the demonstration in Istanbul's famous Taksim Square was Turkish Interior Minister Idris Naim Sahin, among other leaders of Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP). Many western and Turkish journalists have been shocked by the strong sense of nationalism present in the protests in form of slogans and signs."
"Khojaly Massacre Protests gone wrong in Istanbul: 'You are all Armenian, you are all bastards'", *NationalTurk*, February 28, 2012, accessed April 20, 2013.
http://www.nationalturk.com/en/khodzhaly-massacre-protests-gone-wrong-in-istanbul-you-are-all-armenian-you-are-all-bastards-16707.

A significant event of the recent past was the state-funded restoration of a particularly famous tenth-century Armenian monastery, Sourp Khach ("Holy Cross"), on the island of Aghtamar on Lake Van in the eastern part of Turkey. Although thousands of other Armenian cultural monuments have been neglected, this one was earmarked to be renovated as a symbolic goodwill gesture. The project was not accepted with much enthusiasm by either Armenian church or state officials, nor by the Armenian Diaspora. Even though many Armenians did attend the opening ceremony in 2007 and, later on, as the very first mass to be celebrated in the church since 1915 was given the go-ahead in 2010, being held annually since, the fact that the church was classified as a museum with limited religious use, plus the downplaying of its Armenian heritage, did not sit well with the intended target audience. There was in addition controversy regarding the placement of a cross next to the structure, as opposed to on top of the cupola.[41]

In contrast, the renovation in the city of Diyarbakir farther south of what is hailed as the largest Armenian church in the Middle East was greeted with far more open arms, in particular by Diaspora groups. Sourp Giragos Church had also fallen victim to the Armenian Genocide, of course, but the Kurdish-populated city's municipality moved to co-operate with the Turkish-Armenian community to restore the structure and make it re-usable as a religious and cultural centre. Its opening and consecration mass in October 2011 was well-attended and well-received by Armenian media.[42]

Indeed, it is the substantial Kurdish presence in society in Turkey today that often pushes the Armenian agenda. The latest developments on that front, namely, the call by the leader of the PKK in March, 2013, to put down arms and to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the authorities in Ankara, could hold consequences vis-à-vis the situation of Armenians within Turkey and official relations with the Republic of Armenia. Increased visible public reactions to state policy, whether peaceful or not, such as the demonstrations in Istanbul and elsewhere in June, 2013, could also speak to a more general trend towards democratisation or perhaps even liberalisation in the

[41] Phillips, *Diplomatic History*, 20.
[42] Khatchig Mouradian, "Mouradian: Armenians, Locals in Diyarbakir Send Powerful Message", *Armenian Weekly*, October 25, 2011, accessed April 20, 2013, http://www.armenianweekly.com/2011/10/25/mouradian-armenians-locals-in-diyarbakir-send-powerful-message/.

country. But all that, and what that might mean for attitudes towards Armenians or Armenia, remains to be seen.

Something else that remains to be seen is an entirely new order for Turkey itself, as the AKP leadership moves to set up a new constitution, with a stronger presidency. There are fears of rising authoritarianism in a country criticised for the number of its jailed journalists, for example. In a region frought with instability and ongoing violence, ambitions for a wider role to be played by Ankara might come at the price of a more centralised state, if more accommodating to at least its Kurdish minority.[43]

Such speculations aside, ultimately, a major consequence of the success of the AKP in Turkey has been stability in Ankara, a far cry from the situation of the 1990s. It is not surprising, therefore, what with all the heightened activity both within the country and in terms of diplomacy, to find that the most significant episode yet of interactions between Armenia and Turkey as states – albeit, as usual, an unsuccessful one – took place during the AKP's time in power.

[43] "Presidential dreaming", *The Economist*, March 16, 2013, accessed April 20, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21573554-how-peace-deal-kurds-could-pave-way-new-turkish-constitution-presidential.

Chapter VII. *Act II, Scene II:* The Great Anti-Climactic Dénouement. The Armenia-Turkey Protocols

Back in Yerevan, the presidency of Robert Kocharyan came to an end in 2008 following, as usual, disputed elections. This time, however, the opposition was led by the first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who arranged for rallies and sit-ins that ended with violence. March the 1st, 2008, is remembered as one of the low points of modern Armenian history, alongside the 1999 parliamentary attack. Even with his rule in place, the new president, Serge Sargsyan – likewise formerly among the leadership of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as in the case of Kocharyan, and having previously served as defence and prime minister of Armenia – sought to find greater legitimacy. Perhaps by prioritising international legitimacy over the domestic, Sargsyan went ahead with Swiss mediation with regards to Turkey, resulting in the "football diplomacy" and the Armenia-Turkey Protocols.

Swiss-Turkish relations were strained in the early-to-mid 2000s, as a canton's regional parliament and the lower house of the national legislature both passed resolutions recognising and condemning the Armenian Genocide in 2003. Furthermore, a Swiss law prohibiting the minimisation or justification of genocide was used against Turkish officials who publicly denied the Armenian Genocide in Switzerland. Despite the strains, the country initiated a mediatory role between Turkey and Armenia in September, 2007, based on its own rich "good offices" experience and tradition of neutrality. Shuttle diplomacy and secret meetings took place over the next several months, with initial documents and concept papers changing hands, finally resulting about a year later in a text drafted by Switzerland on formal protocols to be exchanged between the states. The United States, meanwhile, was kept out of that process.[44]

May and June, 2008, saw statements by the Armenian president on the possibility of normalising relations between Yerevan and Ankara, including an inter-governmental commission that would "research the historical facts of the genocide". President Sargsyan clarified that, "We are not opposed to any research, even of events that have been widely accepted as fact. However, such a committee would have been logical only after the establishment of diplomatic relations between our nations and

[44] Phillips, *Diplomatic History*, 27-31.

the opening of the border". Naturally, the very idea met with strong opposition, both with the Dashnak Party that was in the governing coalition, soon to withdraw in protest, as well as with the Armenian Diaspora.[45]

Sports provided for the public opportunity to forge closer ties. "Football diplomacy" came to be so called following the historic event of the very first official visit of a Turkish head of state to Armenia, with President Gül spending around six or seven hours in the country in order to attend a football match between the two sides in September, 2008. The event was widely hailed as a breakthrough internationally. It was followed by further meetings at high levels, most notably between the foreign ministers.[46]

On the 22nd of April, 2009 – two days before the annual commemorations of the Armenian Genocide – the foreign ministers of Armenia and Turkey publicly revealed "a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations", put together with the help of the Swiss, and now already with American participation.

> "[Secretary of State] Clinton welcomed the 'historic step towards the establishment of normal relations between the two countries.' However, a copy of the actual Protocols was not made public until August 31, 2009. Lack of transparency fueled speculation and criticism from within Armenia's governing coalition, as well as opposition parties. Armenians also criticized timing [*sic*] of the announcement. [Vice-President] Biden called [Armenian president] Sarkisian on April 22, urging him to announce the roadmap. 'We did it on that date because the U.S. asked us to,' says a senior Armenian official involved in the process. Sami Kohen wrote in [the newspaper] *Milliyet*, 'The goal is to make President Barack Obama not use an expression that will embarrass Turkey in his April 24 message to the Armenians.'"[47]

When their contents were finally published, the Armenia-Turkey Protocols were criticised by the Armenian opposition and the Diaspora for providing the opportunity for the Turks to both formalise "the existing border" or "the common border" (so went the phrasings) between the countries, as well as to showcase dialogue between the states on the genocide issue, thereby fulfilling two of the three longstanding preconditions out of Ankara.[48] As for the third precondition, that of a

[45] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 24.
[46] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 24.
[47] Phillips, *Diplomatic History*, 48. Footnotes omitted.
[48] The full text of the protocols are available in Appendix IV.

pro-Azerbaijan resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, whereas it was not mentioned in the text agreed upon, it was constantly cited by the Turkish leadership as an imperative to move ahead with getting the protocols ratified.[49]

The time-frame envisioned for the signing and ratification of the protocols went nicely with the return football match to be played by the Armenian team in Turkey, which the Armenian president attended. In the meantime, however, the Armenia-Turkey Protocols were due to be signed in Zürich just a few days before that, on the 10th of October, 2009. Prior to the signing, President Sargsyan undertook a Diaspora tour, visiting Armenian communities in Paris, New York, Los Angeles, Beirut, and Rostov-on-Don in Russia. It was only in the last location that he was largely welcomed; everywhere else he faced strong criticism and public rallies calling for withdrawal from the rapprochement process with Turkey.[50]

The signing itself was something of a fiasco, being delayed by three hours as disagreements arose on the texts of the speeches to be delivered by the Armenian and Turkish foreign ministers. There are conflicting reports on the details, but it was only with US mediation that the sides agreed to go ahead with the signing, as long as no-one issued any formal statements afterwards. The compromise was hailed as brilliant diplomatic manoeuvering by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The gathering itself was a major diplomatic event, as the French and Russian foreign ministers were present as well, alongside the European High Representative, to complement the Swiss and American officials. Members of the international community did not hold back in displaying their support.[51]

Azerbaijan, on the other hand, was enraged with the possibility that Ankara and Yerevan could mend fences behind Baku's back.

> "The Protocols took Baku by surprise, despite efforts by Ankara to keep Azerbaijan's leadership informed. U.S. officials also kept Baku in the loop. … When negotiations culminated in an agreement, Baku publicly denounced the Protocols and condemned Turkey for betraying their Turkic brethren."[52]

In fact, protocols between Armenia and Turkey were written out and almost adopted by both sides in late 1992. But the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

[49] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 25.
[50] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 25.
[51] Phillips, *Diplomatic History*, 55-57.
[52] Phillips, *Diplomatic History*, 49.

acted as a pretext to delay and finally to dismiss that possibility.[53] This time as well it was Azerbaijani protests that rang loudest and that reverberated the most.

Things in Yerevan were less than helpful for their part. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia was charged by the government to review the Protocols. It ruled in January, 2010, that, "none of the provisions of the protocols can in any way relate to either the historical veracity of the genocide or the Karabakh conflict and its resolution". Naturally the decision was not welcomed in Turkey, even if it could have no legal effect on the documents being ratified by the Armenian parliament. But things did not progress in either capital when it came to ratification. By April, 2010, President Sargsyan declared that the "reasonable timeframe" to go on with the process was spent, and that the protocols process was frozen.[54]

[53] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 17.
[54] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 26.

Chapter VIII. *Post-Performance Discussion:* Some Assessment in Light of Theory

Different schools of thought of international relations serve to provide different points of view on how to account for given phenomena. It is one of the less fulfilling aspects of international relations theory that, even though it has developed rather meaningfully as a field in social science, it is still far more descriptive and far more useful after the fact, than it has capacity to predict outcomes. At the same time, the theories taken up in this section systematically highlight which elements of the Armenia-Turkey story have been more consequential and which less so, something that can at least point towards the likelihood of where future trends may emerge.

Realism is the most "classical" school of thought of international relations.

> "Classical Realists … share the following assumptions:
> (1) Human nature displays an 'ineradicable tendency to evil'.
> (2) The important unit of social life is the collectivity; in international politics the only really important collective actor is the State.
> (3) Power and its pursuit by individuals and States is ubiquitous and inescapable. Thus the 'important subjects for theoretical consideration are the permanent components of power'.
> (4) International institutions, networks, or norms are epiphenomenal. They are reflections of the prevailing power relations among States, rather than independent factors determining State behaviour.
> (5) The 'real issues of international politics can be understood by the rational analysis of competing interests defined in terms of power'."[55]

Realism is all about states – taking states to be unitary, self-interested actors, not unlike a *homo oeconomicus* model at the international level. One of the problems with taking up realism in the Armenia-Turkey context is that, until 1991, a primary player, the Republic of Armenia, did not even exist as a state. For most of the twentieth century – for most of history, really – the interactions between Turks and Armenians have not been inter-state ones. This fact makes measured historical analysis difficult. Still, the trajectory of the Turkish state, certainly of the Republic of Turkey since 1923, was mapped-out well enough to contribute to the policy inertia seen in the 1990s, and even into the 2000s. The Armenians, for their part, had to struggle with the concepts of state interests and state policy, thrust upon them rather

[55] Anne-Marie Slaughter, *International Law and International Relations* (Hague Academy of International Law Lectures, 2000), 31. Footnotes omitted.

forcefully and suddenly as new challenges. As was seen, it was less than clear in the early 1990s which way Yerevan wanted to go. The only pressing issue was really the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, and that event helped inform Turkish policy towards Armenia much more immediately than anything else.

The other main state player in this case is the United States. Its national interest would certainly call for stability, for the safe passage of hydrocarbon resources, of course, and for the minimalisation of radical anti-Americanism, certainly after 2001 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. But if there is any capital in the world that typifies the main flaw of the realist school of thought – that states are not, in fact, unitary actors – it is Washington. If foreign policy is and continues to be decided and implemented rather efficiently through some few offices in Ankara, the corridors of power in DC could still be concentrated in Foggy Bottom in that sense, but that does not mean that individuals and officials across Pennsylvania Avenue and even across the Potomac do not have a say in some matters. The Armenia-Turkey struggle has played out dramatically in the US Congress. But that is mostly due to the efforts of the organised Armenian Diaspora – which is not, of course, itself a state.

And what of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh? It is and is not a state for its part, pitted against one, Azerbaijan, the policy position of which is abundantly clear when it comes to Armenia and Armenia-Turkey relations. The state interests of Azerbaijan are, in fact, the most undisputed in this story. The realist takes on Russia and Iran, however, could end up producing mixed results, especially given the lack of public information, as well as conflicting economic and political interests, to say nothing of policy inertia that Moscow and Tehran may present.

A couple of other theories might better fit some of the players and scenarios in this thesis.

> "… Liberalism denotes a family of positive theories about how States do behave rather than how they should behave.
> … [T]hree core assumptions:
> (1) the primacy of societal actors: 'The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence.'
> (2) Representation and State preferences: 'States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose

> interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics.'
> (3) Interdependence and the international system: The configuration of interdependent State preferences determines State behaviour – for example, 'what states want is the primary determination of what they do'.
> …
> To dichotomize Realism and Liberalism in more concrete terms, where Realists look for concentrations of State power, Liberals focus on the ways in which interdependence encourages and allows individuals and groups to exert different pressures on national Governments. Where Realists assume 'autonomous' national decision-makers, Liberals examine the nature of domestic representation as the decisive link between societal demands and State policy. Where Realists model patterns of strategic interactions based on fixed State preferences, Liberals seek first to establish the nature and strength of those preferences as a function of the interests and purposes of domestic and transnational actors."[56]

Liberalism offers a better lens to have a more comprehensive take on Armenia-Turkey interactions, especially after one notes the significant events of the 1990s and 2000s that took place involving the Armenian-American Diaspora in particular. The entire TARC episode, for example, started and ended with the State Department as a push for Track II diplomacy more generally. In so doing, it recognised what the Armenian Diaspora meant in the Armenia-Turkey relationship, trying to leverage that channel of interaction in a way that might lead to a positive outcome. Certainly it would match positively with US national interests, and at the same time it was meant to have a back door into Yerevan and Ankara proper, not just as an academic or goodwill exercise. The only way the TARC story does not coincide well with liberalism as an international relations theory is the fact that it was a top-down initiative, at the behest of a state agency.

But the civil society atmosphere that the TARC project helped set up is still going, even if funding has been reduced. More significantly, this year saw commemorations of the Armenian Genocide in Turkey itself once again, a phenomenal change in place since 2010, impossible to imagine even just a few years ago. The assassination of Hrant Dink, among other things, had an effect on at least part of Turkish society. It is not unrealistic to expect long-run or even medium-run consequences on state policy in the end.[57]

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[56] Slaughter, *op. cit.*, 40-42.
[57] Orhan Kemal Cengiz, "Is Turkey Overcoming The Armenian Taboo?", *Al-Monitor*, April 22, 2013, accessed April 26, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/armenian-genocide-taboo-turkey-anniversary.html.

Another prominent school of thought in international relations is institutionalism.

> "Whereas Institutionalists would agree that States are the primary actors in the international system and that, absent institutions, States are engaged in the pursuit of power, they would contend that the presence of institutions modifies the organizing principle of anarchy. The uncertainty and ever-present possibility of conflict that lead States in a Realist world to expect and prepare for the worst is diffused by the information provided by and through institutions. The institutions must thus be factored into systemic explanations of State behaviour independently of structure. Further, having ameliorated the conditions of conflict that force States to concentrate on the quest for power, institutions can facilitate the achievement of common ends.
> … [Institutions] decrease the transaction costs of inter-State relations, increase information to reduce uncertainty, and facilitate communications. In addition, institutions can promote learning, create conditions for orderly negotiations, and facilitate linkages in complex negotiations. They can also legitimize or delegitimize different kinds of behaviour. Finally, they can enhance the value of a State's reputation for honouring commitments, facilitate monitoring of State behaviour, and make decentralized enforcement possible by creating conditions under which reciprocity can operate. … [I]nstitutions can create a particular normative environment that helps shape both State identity and interest."[58]

The institutional frameworks of international affairs have had very little direct impact on the Armenia-Turkey story, as the attempts have been far more bilateral, one capital to the other. It is true that part of the story has played out in international organisations, such as the potential veto over Armenia's membership in the OSCE by Turkey, with the simultaneous welcome given to the Turkey-backed BSEC. And BSEC is still the only forum where formal inter-governmental relations between Armenia and Turkey have allowed for an Armenian representation in Istanbul. One could add the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly as another location where Armenia-Turkey interactions have played out since the 2000s, after both Armenia and Azerbaijan were admitted to that body.

The UN itself has had little to say in the proceedings, but the European Union has served as an interesting fulcrum for Armenians to weigh in on Turkish policy. The European Parliament has passed resolutions on the Armenian Genocide, and Turkish entry into the EU has had – among other, more significant, hindrances – pressure from the Armenian Diaspora with which to contend. Yerevan maintains, however, that

[58] Slaughter, *op. cit.*, 37-38. Footnotes omitted.

having Ankara be a full-fledged member in the EU would serve in Armenia's interests, as that would make Turkish policy far more predictable, besides giving Armenia immediate access to the EU itself, the closed border notwithstanding as of yet.[59]

But the institutional framework does not offer a broad enough vista to capture the more consequential sides of the Armenia-Turkey experience. Geopolitics, though, can be taken up as a wider prism through which to view the region. "Geography makes history" is an only too-apt adage to apply to Western Asia. The energy pipelines have been high on the international agenda, so a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia disputes would be assuring to the billions at stake in Caspian oil and gas. In this regard, the role of Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan is not to be underestimated. Russia in particular has a "traditional" political role to play, and its military presence in Armenia is not insignificant either. A rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey might on the one hand reduce its influence in the region,[60] but, on the other hand, it could also provide economic opportunity in terms of electricity and railway enterprises in Armenia under Russian control, besides a way to circumvent Georgia in the region.[61] Whereas Iran does not have as much of a foot in the Armenia-Turkey door, Azerbaijan has regularly served as the spoiler to any dialogue between Yerevan and Ankara. The war was in full swing in the early 1990s, but even with the cease fire well in place, the Protocols could not go far, mainly because of Baku's intervention.

One former Armenian official thinks of this story as a "perfect failure" – a happy series of events for all sides involved. If Azerbaijan managed to assert itself in the face of international pressure, Armenia displayed its own willingness to initiate a long-bedeviled process. Notably, President Sargsyan's initial announcement was made in Moscow, a fact that was used to highlight in addition the possible Russian hand in the matter. Of course, the Americans and the Europeans joined in the chorus of what would have been a pat on the back to Turkey and to themselves, had the Protocols process worked. In the end, though, it all fell through, much to the satisfaction of the national and, indeed, geopolitical interests of all, it can be argued.

[59] Hakobyan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 22.
[60] David Hovhannisyan, "Armenian Foreign Policy and the Rapprochement with Turkey", Henrich Böll Stiftung, May 13, 2009, accessed April 27, 2013, http://www.boell.de/worldwide/europenorthamerica/europe-north-america-6759.html.
[61] Phillips, *Diplomatic History*, 11-12.

The outcome is quite suitable for argumentation and finger-pointing in the international community.

The most intriguing, if least systematic, school of thought that one may apply to the Armenia-Turkey story is constructivism.

> "… Constructivism … is an *ontology* rather than a theory, in the sense that it is a general conception of what exists rather than what causes what. … Constructivism is both anti-materialist, in the sense that it focuses on ideas and ideals rather than material interests, and anti-rationalist, in the sense that it rejects the idea of instrumental calculation based on fixed preferences.
> … For Constructivists … [the structure of the international system] is also composed of social relationships. These social relationships, in turn, are composed of 'shared knowledge, material resources, and social practices'.
> … '[C]onstructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life.' The realities of international politics are understood 'inter-subjectively', meaning through the collective perception of States or any other actors in the international system. Collective perception, in turn, depends on ideas and principled beliefs as well as material interests, 'social facts' [subjective norms and cultural values] as well as physical facts."[62]

Now, this approach is limited, even vague as an international relations theory as such. However, it brings up the psychological and cultural attitudes that policymakers have that perhaps have the biggest role in shaping policy in this case. The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is an ongoing war, for example, under a cease-fire regime, with mediators negotiating a settlement, as opposed to the aftermath of the break-up of Yugoslavia, say, which is perhaps still not fully resolved, but there is an international legal process in place, garnering as much legitimacy as can be possible, given the circumstances. But whereas both of these international issues surely have cultural and social connotations, they have at the same time a tangible framework within which they are playing out which serve both to contain the disputes, and also to resolve them.

On the other hand, tracing the Armenia-Turkey divide to the First World War, it can be concluded that the time has long since passed for any mechanism to be put in place to resolve any real, on-the-ground conflict. What remains today is collective memory and national consciousness, imbued in a nation-state purposefully so designed – Turkey – and a nation-state with a long, colourful historical memory, not quite fit into a niche, nor having fully constructed a sturdy one of its own – Armenia.

[62] Slaughter, *op. cit.*, 46-47. Emphasis in the original. Footnotes omitted.

Practical steps taken in the early 1990s did not work for the most part, it is true, as a consequence of very material, very pragmatic reasons, namely the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. But even so, about two decades on, concrete steps to be taken by the two states were viewed with immense distrust and misgiving, be it in Ankara or Yerevan or the Diaspora. It has only been with American encouragement that Track II has managed to make the headway that it has. Other non-conventional or novel efforts such as public diplomacy or the use of new media could only do so much, and certainly it can be argued that they would ultimately amount to nothing without the presence of embassies proper.

The cultural and psychological connotations of the Armenia-Turkey story are further explored in the next section.

Chapter IX. *Concluding Soliloquies:* Recognition and Narratives of Identity[63]

It is evidently a great barrier, then, that lies in the way of any Armenian-Turkish interaction, whether it is between two individuals or the two states. History hangs heavy, and the Turkish insistence on letting go of the genocide issue speaks just as much to the psychology manifested by Armenians as it does to that borne by Turks. Just what does it mean "to recognise the Armenian Genocide" anyway, much less to pursue or give up the cause of *international* recognition of it?

As far as academia goes, it is rather clear that most serious scholarship qualifies the experience of the Armenians and other Christian groups in the final years of the Ottoman Empire as genocide. The academic world has a harder time maintaining that general line in particular in Turkey, as well as in Azerbaijan, but also among some researchers outside those two countries. The issue is a highly politicised one, needless to add, with allegations and investigations of funding from Ankara going towards institutions in the United States and elsewhere to promote the narrative of uncertainty in the details of what happened to the Armenians, and also to emphasise that ethnic Turks, or Muslims more generally, also underwent suffering during the First World War, especially as many were deported from the Balkans and the Caucasus region. In addition, irregular ethnic Armenian forces and even units serving under the ephemeral 1918 Republic of Armenia did, in fact, fight against the regular Turkish army and target civilian Turkish or Muslim populations in the regions in the east, in or near Russian Armenia. The Turkish narrative therefore tries to stress the overall situation of war and how all sides were involved, the necessity being at present to look to the future. That there was an organised campaign of violence by Armenians against Turkish officials and interests around the world in the 1970s and 1980s – mostly individual diplomats – only adds to the Turkish perceptions, the mistrust and suspicion being particularly stark in the Turkish foreign policy establishment.

Things have changed over the past few decades, however, in particular since the end of the Cold War. The Turkish position of outright denial of any wrongdoing or unpleasant events has subtly shifted to a more neutral stance of acknowledging

[63] This section borrows from an essay I wrote for a Turkish journal: Nareg Seferian, "The final frontiers: The various borders between Armenia and Turkey", *Turkish Review*, Volume 3, Issue 3, May-June 2013.

some human tragedy, but avoiding the word "genocide". So much seems to hinge on the use of that word. It has gained national-psychological weight, if one may characterise it as such, for both Armenians and Turks, to the extent that the use, misuse, abuse, or disuse of "the g-word" has held immediate sway in dictating policy, from and to all corners. The constructivist would not care so much about the fact of the Armenian Genocide as how the genocide has given rise to a "social fact", an "inter-subjective" space within which the Armenian-Turkish story has almost entirely played out for the past two or three generations at least.

The term itself was coined soon after the Second World War, as the aftermath of the Holocaust was being dealt with in light of a new international regime under the auspices of the United Nations. The 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was spearheaded by a Polish-American jurist of Jewish background, Raphael Lemkin, who came up with the word "genocide" (a hybrid Greek-Latin compound meaning "race/tribe-killing"), basing it on the recent experience of the Jewish and other targetted populations in Europe, and also on the case of the Armenians from the previous world war. A US government statement from 1951 as part of an International Court of Justice advisory opinion pertaining to reservations to the Genocide Convention adds even the persecution of the early Christians in the Roman Empire as an example of genocide alongside "the Turkish massacres of Armenians, the extermination of millions of Jews and Poles by the Nazis" as "outstanding examples of the crime of genocide".[64] Of course, the argument from Ankara is that treaties and conventions cannot be enforced retroactively, and so the description of any event before 1948 as genocide would be inaccurate, at least legally. The ICTJ analysis commissioned by TARC supported that view.

More than that, however, the issue is, once again, that of culture and national psychology. Forming and developing the Turkish nation-state was a purposeful, pointed act, one in which such a heinous crime could not feature. A few generations in Turkey by this point have been educated in a manner that sets the public perception of national identity in rather strict and rather proud terms. If the Armenians feature at all in the national history of an educated Turk, it would be as an enemy within, as a fifth column for encroaching Russians or other Great Powers. What is known as "the

[64] Armenian National Institute, "Written statement of the U.S.A.", in "Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide", International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, May 28th, 1951, accessed April 23, 2013, http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.388/current_category.6/affirmation_detail.html.

Sèvres Syndrome" can still haunt the public consciousness of Turks: the plan to carve up the country, the nation – a big chunk of which would go to Armenia.

For the Armenians, what is referred to as "the Armenian Cause" is really a product of the 1960s, coming up as the fiftieth anniversary of the genocide loomed in both Soviet Armenia – which was by then a stable, somewhat prosperous, and more informed society after the Stalin years – as well as the organised Diaspora which, within a generation, had established itself well throughout the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas. Perhaps the concept of genocide and the in many ways enviable progress of Israel and the cause of Zionism also served as an inspiration or added to the legitimacy of bringing up an unpunished crime within the community and to the public at large. Not that there was no Armenian Cause before; even at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the leadership of the 1918 Armenian Republic tried to catch the ears of the officials from Washington, Moscow, and London to live up to the promises made more than two decades earlier. To no avail, however.[65]

What were those promises? The Armenians and other persecuted Christians were a hot topic in the international press at the time, clearly serving to vilify the Ottoman Empire, which was allied with the Teutonic enemies of the Entente circles. The Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 would have served well, if implemented, to cut out an Armenia from part of the Sultan's realm, an Armenia that might have been a mandatory American power under the League of Nations. Of course, the United States never got on board with the grand designs of its president. But Woodrow Wilson is still revered as a national hero by Armenians, if for nothing else than for his support in the work of the American Committee for Syrian and Armenian Relief (still functioning, now known as the Near East Foundation) that saved the lives of tens of thousands of refugees and orphans. In fact, the response of the American public to the massacres and deportations of Christians is viewed as the first great international humanitarian effort.

Naturally, the genocide and its aftermath – whether in the clamped-down Soviet Union, or in the refugee communities of Armenians most elsewhere – left a communal, public trauma that came to be the hallmark of what it meant to be Armenian. Annual commemorations, marches, and the like, continue to serve as the

[65] For an account of Armenian advocacy work in America from the 1920s on to the 2000s, see Michael Bobelian, *Children of Armenia: A Forgotten Genocide and the Century-long Struggle for Justice* (Simon & Schuster, 2009).

great rallying point for the very identity of Armenians all over the world – and even to a large extent within Armenia, especially given that that place was not Armenia *per se*, but the USSR for a very long time. Moreover, many, not to say most, in Armenia are themselves descendants of Armenian Genocide survivors. Although it is true that the danger of assimilation, of loss of language, religion, or culture is not a risk in today's independent Armenia as it might have been in Soviet times, the tragedy of the genocide is nevertheless unquestionably shared, even if it is not as much of a necessitated cornerstone as it can be in the Diaspora. In the end, today, when there may or may not be barely a handful of individuals who could be considered directly connected with the Armenian Genocide (mostly those who were infants or children in the period 1915-1923; certainly no perpatrators), the clash is perceived to be as something between Armenians and Turks as peoples, as a conflict between their identities, or the narratives thereof.

One might add, since 1988, a similar situation between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, only going the other way round, inasmuch as it is the Armenians who are portrayed in Azerbaijan as the ones who have carried out genocide against the Azerbaijani people and who occupy "Western Azerbaijan" (echoing the Armenian term "Western Armenia", used to refer to much of eastern Turkey today) alongside Nagorno-Karabakh, thereby matching well with the Armenian narrative with regards to Turkey. But the details in this case differ in some marked ways, not the least of which being the presence of a living memory of war and suffering on all sides, and an ongoing, internationally-sanctioned and -mediated conflict resolution process, as mentioned before. Yet the policy positions of Baku and Ankara with regards to Armenian Diaspora organisations tend to go together, even if the two have not always seen quite eye-to-eye when it comes to relations with Yerevan.

In 1965, when a national parliament, that of Uruguay, passed for the first time a resolution with the terms "Armenian Martyrs" included in it, that act served as an affirmation of one narrative over another. That there was a relatively large and influential Armenian population in that country was, naturally, a major factor. The significance lies in the fact that it was the first time that the Armenian Cause manifested itself in an inter-state light, even if in Montevideo, far away from Western Asia. Not even in Soviet Armenia, where a re-awakening of the identity and the genocide got in full swing in the 1960s, did any Armenian Genocide resolution make its way to a Supreme Soviet, either in Yerevan or in Moscow. It was a while before

the second such resolution was passed, in 1982 in Cyprus, this time unequivocally referring to "the genocide of the Armenian people", adding clauses on appreciating Armenian contributions to Cypriot life (plus using the occasion to condemn the Turkish intervention on the island of 1974). The European Parliament likewise adopted a resolution "on a political solution to the Armenian question" in 1987. The US House of Representatives, for its part, contributed two resolutions, one in 1975 and one in 1984, both commemorating the 24th of April as the "National Day of Remembrance of Man's Inhumanity to Man", in memory of all victims of genocide, "especially" for those of Armenian ancestry. A speech by President Reagan in 1981 on the occasion of marking the Holocaust also slipped in a more or less explicit Armenian Genocide reference, using that word. The US position has never made it to sustained national, federal policy, however, even though 43 out of 50 states have also passed similar resolutions at least once.[66]

The 1990s saw such measures take place at a far quicker pace. Similar resolutions or more solemn laws were taken up by Argentina in 1993, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007, Russia in 1995, Greece in 1996, Canada in 1996, 2002, and 2004, Lebanon in 1997 and 2000, Belgium in 1998, France in 1998, 2000, and 2001, Italy in 2000, and so on, alongside provinces or municipal authorities, European bodies, etc. 2005 was a particularly prolific year: Poland, Argentina, Germany, Venezuela, and Lithuania formally chimed in on the ninetieth anniversary commemorations of the Armenian Genocide. Clearly, the independence of the Republic of Armenia on the one hand, and the presidency of Robert Kocharyan on the other, was a major stimulus in getting the Armenian Genocide recognised.

"Recognising", as can be gathered, means sanctioning a document that acknowledges the event, hopefully qualifies it explicitly as "genocide" (which has not always been the case), expresses sympathy with the Armenian people, and calls on Turkey as a state to do all of the above – to meaningfully address its past, perhaps to somehow atone for it.

This last detail makes all the difference. What is the endgame? How is it imagined from Ankara's perspective? What do the Armenians want, anyway? These

[66] An extensive list of official statements at all levels by countries, their administrative units, heads of state, international organisations, and courts is available through the website of the Armenian National Institute, "International Affirmation of the Armenian Genocide", accessed April 23, 2013, http://www.armenian-genocide.org/affirmation.html.

unanswered questions have been at the heart of the give-and-take of the past five decades.

That there is no specific, broadly-shared vision to the Armenian Cause is problematic for Ankara to consider. The country would not know to what it would be committing itself and who would support what policy to what extent. Certainly all Armenians would agree that recognition and a formal apology are called for. It would probably be fair to say that all Armenians would like the Armenian cultural heritage in Turkey – or what remains of it – to be cared for by the state, for the education system in the country to properly portray to its people the legacy of the Christian population and what exactly became of it, besides giving broad rights and freedoms for Armenian cultural expression in the country in terms of religion and language. Beyond that, however, whether any monetary compensation, any reparations could be made, whether any territory even could or ought to be ceded to Armenia, remain unclear possibilities. The risks, therefore, from Ankara's perspective, are very high indeed. As for the Armenians, the Dashnak and non-Dashnak Diaspora groups rarely agree, and the Republic of Armenia has maintained mixed state policies. It was ironically President Kocharyan who, as mentioned, rather explicitly stated in an interview with a Turkish journalist that Armenia does not have any legal basis to demand territory from Turkey,[67] although President Sargsyan, twelve years later, conveyed a contrary message in a meeting with Armenian school children.[68]

Another line of argumentation has been taken by a former diplomat of Armenia who has been trying to leverage concepts of international law in Armenia's favour. According to Ara Papian, the Treaty of Sèvres was an international document made by the legal and legitimate powers of the time, including all the Great Powers, as well as the Ottoman Sultan and the 1918 Republic of Armenia. They all agreed to have US President Wilson decide on the frontier between Armenia and Turkey, with his arbitral award being binding on those two states and receiving recognition by the international community. The later agreements that disregarded that decision, namely the treaties of Moscow and Kars, were made by non-recognised, illegitimate, and therefore illegal entities that only claimed to be governments, in addition acting to

[67] Phillips, *Diplomatic History*, 16; also cited in footnote 20.
[68] Gayane Abrahamyan, "Armenia shrugs off Turkish 'hysteria' as Erdogan says Sargsyan owes apology over 'Western Armenia' comment", *ArmeniaNow*, July 28, 2011, accessed 23 April 2013, http://www.armenianow.com/news/31404/serzh_sargsyan_recep_erdogan_armenia_comment.

place obligations on a third entity – illegal for its part.[69] Maybe by the time of the Treaty of Lausanne – or rather, *with* the Treaty of Lausanne – Mustafa Kemal asserted his place and his regime in the world in 1923, but the treaties in the meantime were null and void according to international law. Papian brings similar arguments vis-à-vis the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

It is a little bit difficult to judge how far this presentation of the case would go at the International Court of Justice, for example – is there a statute of limitations, a question of *estoppel*, of state succession, or of differences in international law between 1918 and 1991 or even 2013? – but the presence of this *kind* of argumentation indicates seriousness by at least some quarters in taking the Armenian-Turkish issue to the level of public international law, one more field about which Ankara could be worried, or towards which it could be prepared. On the other hand, as preparations are made at the state level to commemorate the centenary of the Armenian Genocide in 2015, there is yet a lack of focus in putting together "a united, consensual legal package" of claims against Turkey, according to the official charged with co-ordinating those activities.[70]

The Armenian-American Diaspora has been the most active and the most vigilant in terms of pursuing the Armenian Cause, in part because its numbers have been consistently rising over the course of the twentieth century, and also because civic activism and advocacy, to say nothing of regulated lobbying, form part of the American political culture. (Although the number of ethnic Armenians in Russia is probably higher, the tradition of an organised Diaspora is still nascent in that country because of Russia's own social and political culture, and also because so many Armenians who came to live there did so not as a Diaspora *per se*, but simply by moving from one part of the country, that is the USSR, to another.) It has been in American academic circles, spearheaded by ethnic Armenians and also others, that the discipline of Armenian Studies more broadly and the study of the Armenian Genocide in particular has developed, that it has percolated to the realm of wider public discourse, even public education in some states. The Armenian Cause has maintained

[69] Ara Papian's works can be read through the aptly-named website *Modus Vivendi: Wilson for Armenia*, http://www.wilsonforarmenia.org/Publications.htm, accessed June 12, 2013.
[70] Siranuysh Gevorgyan, "Plans for 100th Anniversary Appeal: Leader of commission says unity needed in quest for Genocide Recognition", *ArmeniaNow*, April 22, 2013, accessed April 22, 2013, http://www.armenianow.com/genocide/45539/armenian_genocide_hayk_demoyan_ottoman_empire.

itself in the United States at the level of the informed, organised community, the elite of which has at the same time managed to sustain and reproduce itself.

It is in the Armenian-American Diaspora that one has seen the most reaction, either positive or negative, to moves by the Armenian, Turkish, or American states, that has garnered real attention, and has caused real policy changes. To give another example, the successors of life insurance companies that functioned in the Ottoman Empire and that held on to the policies of ethnic Armenian beneficiaries have been successfully sued for compensation for their descendants over the course of the 2000s. So maybe such actions do not have immediate political implications, but they do serve the Cause, inasmuch as they get the issue to the public sphere, and at the very least serve as a public relations embarrassment to Turkey. The American social and political context allows for it, and the Armenians have taken full advantage of that sort of leverage, sometimes rubbing Washington itself or even Yerevan the wrong way, always playing the thorn in Ankara's side, and certainly that of Baku as well.

The narrative of suffering and victimisation goes on, but, at least for Armenian-Americans, the Armenian Cause evokes a broader human rights issue. Genocide is a *jus cogens* matter, it cannot be tolerated under any circumstances, even if the incident itself has long passed. It needs to be addressed, otherwise it can risk being repeated, so it is insisted. Rwanda and Darfur come up often in the Armenian-American discourse. The narrative in the Diaspora has become concrete, involving not only justice and human rights, but American sovereignty in the face of a moral imperative. Information on foreign-paid lobbying in Washington is publicly available; literally millions have been spent by Turkey on communicating its message across Capitol Hill and its environs. The Armenian efforts are by and large home-grown, even with participation, at times nominal, at times more substantive, by the embassy in DC and consulate-general in LA.

Back home, Armenia and Turkey continue to share one of the most paradoxical relationships between any two neighbouring states: a closed border and no embassies, but regular flights between Istanbul and Yerevan, with visas issued on arrival for citizens of the other country (except for a period of heightened Armenian Diaspora lobbying between December, 2000 and January, 2002, during which Republic of Armenia passport-holders had to receive Turkish visas in third countries). Thousands of citizens of Armenia continue to live and work in Turkey, with many preferring to holiday on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. Ethnic Armenians of a

number of different citizenships have in recent years taken to tours or pilgrimages in large numbers through the lands of their ancestors. Such circumstances were naturally unthinkable during the Cold War, but even in the 1990s, it would have been a rarity to find regular travel by Armenians in Turkey or open public discussion by Turks about Armenians, to say nothing of how the Armenian Genocide has been marked by human rights and civic groups in Turkey itself for the fourth year in a row now, as mentioned above.

It is shifts in Ankara and in Washington more than anywhere else that offer the most compelling account for all the significant events and all the changes that the Armenia-Turkey and Armenians-Turks story has witnessed over the course of the 1990s and 2000s. Looking ahead, if there are to be any real, tangible moves in any direction, one must expect them to come out of these two capitals, either as social and political phenomena manifested in domestic Turkish life, or as new priorities set by the White House or Congress, nearly always with Armenian-American Diasporans on the sidelines. More probably it is the former that can serve as the greater driving force, because the US would find it difficult to be in a position to impose any changes in the region, only to react positively or to resist them. Turkish political life, for its part, has showcased a distinct lack of being dull or static over the last few decades.

The Republic of Armenia itself is not without agency, but its own resources are limited. If hostilities are to break out again over Nagorno-Karabakh, surely the strategy there will be directed by Yerevan, and that will have a wider regional effect, drawing in Russia beyond doubt, as well as quite possibly Iran and Europe, besides Azerbaijan's immediate participation. Outside of that scenario, however, Ankara cannot feel compelled to react to Yerevan.

Ankara is affected, however, by political Islam, with which its ruling party is always tied, if mildly, and the question of the Kurds, currently in immense flux. Indeed, the narrative a hundred years and more ago was that of the Christian Armenians as loyal subjects, a protected people under the Caliph, the Sultan, with his Sublime Porte at Constantinople. Such religious overtones would be less appealing today, both domestically and internationally. Still, if an arrangement with the Kurds can be made with a narrative of "the Turkish elder brother" (as opposed to "the Deep State" being a "Big Brother"), then perhaps the Armenians can be accommodated within it as well. Also, behaviour with regards to an independent Kurdistan next door

might help inform conduct towards the Republic of Armenia, even if there is no oil or gas to be found in the latter.

The Armenian Diaspora as a stakeholder remains under-represented, if represented at all. There is no single body that claims the entire Ottoman-Armenian lineage. It is the Armenian-American organised Diaspora, more significantly the Dashnak-affiliated bodies, that have held the most clout, and so, any sort of reconciliation moves must somehow draw them in – crucially, from the very start, from the initial stage of negotiation, up to the end. TARC purposefully avoided the Dashnak Diaspora and ended up being an easy target for it.

The challenge lies firstly in coming up with a united Armenian position, including the Dashnak Diaspora. It would be helpful to involve the larger non-Dashnak organisations as well, and, notably, the Armenian Church and its denominations. But surely any inter-state agreement would have to end up going through the Republic of Armenia in order to be presented to the Republic of Turkey. Matters would become more complicated if, in future, a government led by the Dashnak Party comes to power in Yerevan, as Armenian state policy in that case might end up becoming more hard-line, whether or not the Dashnak Diaspora is called to the table. On the other hand, such a scenario could also end up diluting the Dashnak faction's own positions as a political party within Armenia, as opposed to an over-arching Diasporan body.

Arranging for the Armenians to speak with one voice is hard enough, having that voice make it to Ankara would present its own difficulties, especially given that the relations between the countries today remain less than cordial, ever since the Protocols were frozen. It could indeed be the case that, if the Armenian state committee mentioned above charged with commemorating the Armenian Genocide centenary co-ordinates its work well, 2015 could serve as a meaningful turning point, with a concrete document put into circulation to act as a basis for future dialogue. That year will certainly see a lot of public relations work at every level for both Armenians and Turks.

Meanwhile, however, the Armenia-Turkey story is at something of a stalemate, awaiting moves more on the part of Turkey than anywhere else. Reconciliation or a lasting peace seem far away, beyond the horizon – certainly not scheduled to be performed, nor even rehearsed, anytime soon.

Appendices

Appendix I

The Armenia-Turkey Stage

Players Affecting Relations between Turkey and Armenia

Turkey

Armenia

The organised Armenian Diaspora
including the Dashnak faction ("nationalists", "hard-liners")
and non-Dashnaks ("liberals")

The United States

Azerbaijan

"Europe and Other"

The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh)

The Armenians of Turkey and their supporters, notably Kurds within Turkey

Russia

Communities of Turks and Azerbaijanis in the West

Iran

On the sidelines: Georgia, Israel and the Jewish-American lobby

Possible future player: Kurdistan(s)

Appendix II

Select Major and Minor Incidents and Episodes
since the period towards the end of the Cold War, as outlined in
Tatul Hakobyan, *Armenians and Turks: From War to Cold War and to Diplomacy*
(Yerevan, 2013)

1988 (to 1994)
The movement and armed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh)

mid-December, 1990
Soviet Armenian official in Ankara for BSEC founding conference

September, 1991
Referendum on independence in Armenia

16 October, 1991
Levon Ter-Petrosyan elected president of Armenia

late 1991
Proposal for the port of Trabzon to serve Armenia
brought forward by a Jewish-Turkish and an Armenian-American businessman

9 November, 1991
Turkey recognises Azerbaijan

16 December, 1991
Turkey recognises Armenia

January, 1992
Armenia gains membership in the OSCE
with US mediation in the face of Turkish pressure

February, 1992
Turkey and Armenia among founding members of BSEC in Istanbul

June, 1992
Izmir, Turkey: Official Armenian delegation in an international conference
Rio de Janeiro: Armenian and Turkish presidents meet at sidelines of UN conference
Istanbul: Armenian and Turkish presidents meet during BSEC conference

August, 1992
Turkish delegation in Yerevan

September, 1992
Armenian president meets with Turkish foreign minister at UN in New York

October, 1992
Armenian foreign minister resigns following controversial speech in Istanbul

late 1992-early 1993
Initial preparations on protocols for diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia (never implemented)

late 1992-1993
Wheat and grain shipments via land through Turkey

late 1992
Plans for provision of electricity to Armenia via Turkey scrapped in Turkey due to domestic pressure and in light of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

4 April, 1993
Turkey unilaterally seals land border with Armenia, following Armenian advances in Nagorno-Karabakh. Airspace also blockaded for two years.

April, 1993
Armenian president Ter-Petrosyan attends the funeral of Turkish president Özal

September, 1993
Military build-up by Turkey on the border and three incidents of firing in Armenia's direction; Kurdish issue used as a pretext

April, 1995
Airspace blockade by Turkey lifted following pressure from the US

1995
80th anniversary of Armenian Genocide commemorated
Armenian Genocide museum and institute opened in Yerevan

October, 1995
Armenia re-opens its nuclear power plant. Concerns from Turkey regarding its safety

August, 1997
The Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) established

March, 1998
Robert Kocharyan elected president of Armenia

5 June, 1998
New Armenian president and Turkish president meet at sidelines of BSEC summit in Yalta

September, 1998
Kocharyan mentions Armenian Genocide during speech at the UN in New York

27 October, 1999
Armed attack on the Armenian parliament. Senior politicians killed

October, 2000
House Resolution 596 on the Armenian Genocide pulled from US Congress upon intervention by President Clinton

December, 2000 to January, 2002
Citizens of the Republic of Armenia refused visa upon arrival in Turkey

28 February, 2002
Official Armenian representation to BSEC opens in Istanbul – the only formal, permanent "inter-governmental exchange" between the two countries

February, May, June, 2002
Meetings between Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers at international for a

June, 2003
Meeting at the Turkish representation to the UN with non-Dashnak Armenian Diaspora organisations based in the US and Canada

June, September, December, 2003
Meetings between Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers at international fora

June, September, 2004
Meetings between Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers at international fora

2004-2005
An American and a French insurance company agree to pay out compensation to descendants of policyholders who were victims of the Armenian Genocide

2005
Exchange of letters between Turkish prime minister and Armenian president
80th anniversary of Armenian Genocide commemorated

2005-2007
Secret and confidential meetings between Armenia and Turkey with Swiss mediation

September, 2005
After being twice delayed, academic conference on Ottoman-Armenians held in Istanbul

19 January, 2007
Hrant Dink, Istanbul-Armenian journalist, editor of a bilingual weekly, killed

October, 2007
House Resolution 106 on the Armenian Genocide passes foreign affairs committee, but does not make it to US Congress for full vote

February, 2008
Serge Sargsyan elected president of Armenia

June, 2008
Armenian president publicly invites Turkish president, mentions possibility of inter-governmental commission

September, 2008
"Football diplomacy". Football match between Armenia and Turkey in Yerevan
Turkish president visits for around six-seven hours
Armenian Football Federation temporarily removes Mt. Ararat from its logo

mid-December, 2008
Online "I apologise" declaration campaign by Turkish activists and intellectuals

29 January, 2009
Armenian president and Turkish prime minister meet at sidelines of Davos
Meeting between Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers

7 February, 2009
Meeting between Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers at Munich conference

22 April, 2009
Public statement by Turkey, Switzerland, and Armenia on existence of "road map" on eve of Armenian Genocide memorial day

7 May, 2009
Meeting between Turkish and Armenian presidents in Prague

31 August, 2009
Armenia-Turkey Protocols published

October, 2009
Armenian president visits five Diaspora communities in light of Protocols

10 October, 2009
Armenia-Turkey Protocols signed in Zürich

14 October, 2009
Return football match between Armenia and Turkey in Bursa

January, 2010
Constitutional Court of Armenia rules on qualifying the Protocols

March, 2010
House Resolution 252 on the Armenian Genocide passes foreign affairs committee, but does not make it to US Congress for full vote

22 April, 2010
President Sargsyan declares the Armenia-Turkey Protocols process suspended

24 April, 2010
Human rights activists mark the Armenian Genocide in Istanbul

Appendix III

ICTJ Report Executive Summary

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II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

International law generally prohibits the retroactive application of treaties unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established. The Genocide Convention contains no provision mandating its retroactive application. To the contrary, the text of the Convention strongly suggests that it was intended to impose prospective obligations only on the States party to it. Therefore, no legal, financial or territorial claim arising out of the Events could successfully be made against any individual or state under the Convention.

The term genocide, as used in the Convention to describe the international crime of that name, may be applied, however, to many and various events that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Convention. References to genocide as a historical fact are contained in the text of the Convention and its *travaux preparatoires*.

As it has been developed by the International Criminal Court (whose Statute adopts the Convention's definition of genocide), the crime of genocide has four elements: (i) the perpetrator killed one or more persons; (ii) such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group; (iii) the perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that group, as such; and (iv) the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.

There are many accounts of the Events, and significant disagreement among them on many issues of fact. Notwithstanding these disagreements, the core facts common to all of the various accounts of the Events we reviewed establish that three of the elements listed above were met: (1) one or more persons were killed; (2) such persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group; and (3) the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group. For purposes of assessing whether the Events, viewed collectively, constituted genocide, the only relevant area of disagreement is on whether the Events were perpetrated with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. While this legal memorandum is not intended to definitively resolve particular factual disputes, we believe that the most reasonable conclusion to draw from the various accounts of the Events is that at least some of the perpetrators of the Events knew that the consequence of their actions would be the destruction, in whole or in part, of the Armenians of eastern Anatolia, as such, or acted purposively towards this goal, and, therefore, possessed the requisite genocidal intent. Because the other three elements identified above have been definitively established, the Events, viewed collectively, can thus be said to include all of the elements of the crime of genocide as defined in the Convention, and legal scholars as well as historians, politicians, journalists and other people would be justified in continuing to so describe them.

…

Source: International Center for Transitional Justice, *The Applicability of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to Events Which Occurred During the Early Twentieth Century* (2002), accessed May 2, 2013, http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Turkey-Armenian-Reconciliation-2002-English.pdf.

Appendix IV

The Protocols

Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey

The Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey,
Desiring to establish good neighbourly relations and to develop bilateral cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and other fields for the benefit of their peoples, as envisaged in the Protocol on the development of relations signed on the same day,
Referring to their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe,
Reconfirming their commitment, in their bilateral and international relations, to respect and ensure respect for the principles of equality, sovereignty, nonintervention in internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers,
Bearing in mind the importance of the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of trust and confidence between the two countries that will contribute to the strengthening of peace, security and stability of the whole region, as well as being determined to refrain from the threat or the use of force, to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Confirming the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined by the relevant treaties of international law,
Emphasizing their decision to open the common border,
Reiterating their commitment to refrain from pursuing any policy incompatible with the spirit of good neighbourly relations,
Condemning all forms of terrorism, violence and extremism irrespective of their cause, pledging to refrain from encouraging and tolerating such acts and to cooperate in combating against them,
Affirming their willingness to chart a new pattern and course for their relations on the basis of common interests, goodwill and in pursuit of peace, mutual understanding and harmony,
Agree to establish diplomatic relations as of the date of the entry into force of this Protocol in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and to exchange Diplomatic Missions.

This Protocol and the Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia shall enter into force on the same day, i.e., on the first day of the first month following the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Signed in (place) on (date) in Armenian, Turkish and English authentic copies in duplicate. In case of divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA FOR THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations
between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia

The Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia,
Guided by the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia signed on the same day,
Considering the perspectives of developing their bilateral relations, based on confidence and respect to their mutual interests,
Determining to develop and enhance their bilateral relations, in the political, economic, energy, transport, scientific, technical, cultural issues and other fields, based on common interests of both countries,
Supporting the promotion of the cooperation between the two countries in the international and regional organisations, especially within the framework of the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the BSEC,
Taking into account the common purpose of both States to cooperate for enhancing regional stability and security for ensuring the democratic and sustainable development of the region,
Reiterating their commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional and international disputes and conflicts on the basis of the norms and principles of international law,
Reaffirming their readiness to actively support the actions of the international community in addressing common security threats to the region and world security and stability, such as terrorism, transnational organised crimes, illicit trafficking of drugs and arms,
1. *Agree* to open the common border within 2 months after the entry into force of this Protocol,
2. *Agree* to conduct regular political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries;
implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations;
make the best possible use of existing transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks between the two countries, and to undertake measures in this regard;
develop the bilateral legal framework in order to foster cooperation between the two countries;
cooperate in the fields of science and education by encouraging relations between the appropriate institutions as well as promoting the exchange of specialists and students, and act with the aim of preserving the cultural heritage of both sides and launching common cultural projects;
establish consular cooperation in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 in order to provide necessary assistance and protection to the citizens of the two countries;
take concrete measures in order to develop trade, tourism and economic cooperation between the two countries; engage in a dialogue and reinforce their cooperation on environmental issues.
3. *Agree* on the establishment of an intergovernmental bilateral commission which shall comprise separate sub-commissions for the prompt implementation of the commitments mentioned in operational paragraph 2 above in this Protocol. To prepare

the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions, a working group headed by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be created 2 months after the day following the entry into force of this Protocol. Within 3 months after the entry into force of this Protocol, these modalities shall be approved at ministerial level. The intergovernmental commission shall meet for the first time immediately after the adoption of the said modalities. The subcommissions shall start their work at the latest 1 month thereafter and they shall work continuously until the completion of their mandates.
Where appropriate, international experts shall take part in the sub-commissions.
The timetable and elements agreed by both sides for the implementation of this Protocol are mentioned in the annexed document, which is an integral part of this Protocol.
This Protocol and the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia shall enter into force on the same day, i.e., on the first day of the first month following the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Signed in (date, place) in Turkish, Armenian and English authentic copies in duplicate. In case of divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY FOR THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Source: David L. Phillips, *Diplomatic History: The Turkey-Armenia Protocols* (2012), accessed May 4, 2013, http://hrcolumbia.org/peacebuilding/diplomatic_history.pdf.

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